State of Minnesota v. Christopher Thomas Wenthe
2015 Minn. LEXIS 369
Minn.2015Background
- Wenthe, a Roman Catholic priest, was charged and convicted under Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(Z)(i) for sexual penetration of A.F. during a meeting in which she sought or received spiritual counsel; the State presented evidence of penetration at multiple meetings (notably Nov. 13 and Nov. 14, 2003).
- The complaint added the single-meeting count on the day trial began and alleged the offense occurred sometime between November 1 and December 31, 2003.
- The district court instructed the jury on unanimity generally but did not give a specific‑unanimity instruction requiring jurors to agree on the same meeting; the jury convicted on the single‑meeting count and acquitted on the ongoing‑basis count.
- The court refused Wenthe’s proposed instruction requiring the clergy member to have knowledge that the complainant sought or received spiritual counsel at the meeting, and it limited admission of Wenthe’s proffered sexual‑history evidence under the rape‑shield law (while the State nonetheless elicited testimony suggesting A.F. was sexually inexperienced).
- On appeal the court of appeals reversed on three grounds (unanimity instruction, mens rea/knowledge element, and exclusion of sexual‑history evidence); the Supreme Court granted review and reversed the court of appeals, reinstating the conviction.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Wenthe's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether omission of a specific‑unanimity instruction was plain error affecting substantial rights | No — any unanimity error was harmless because the record focused on the Nov. 13 meeting and jurors necessarily found at least one meeting met both elements | Yes — omission risked jurors convicting without agreeing on the same specific meeting | No error affecting substantial rights — reasonable jurors would not have relied on a later meeting but not Nov. 13, so failure to give specific instruction was harmless |
| Whether the clergy sexual‑conduct statute requires the clergy member to know the complainant sought/received spiritual counsel | No — statute’s mens rea attaches to sexual penetration (intent to penetrate); attendant‑circumstance (spiritual counsel) carries no separate knowledge requirement | Yes — due process requires mens rea for the spiritual‑counsel element because that attendant circumstance is what makes otherwise lawful sex criminal | Held: No additional knowledge required; statute does not impose strict liability and mens rea need not be implied for the spiritual‑counsel element |
| Whether district court abused discretion by excluding Wenthe’s sexual‑history evidence after State elicited evidence suggesting A.F. was inexperienced | The exclusion was proper under Minn. R. Evid. 412; Wenthe’s proffer had low probative value and high prejudicial effect; any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | The State ‘‘opened the door’’ by portraying A.F. as naive; due process required admission to rebut and present a full defense | Held: No abuse of discretion; State’s admission of some testimony was improper, but exclusion of Wenthe’s proffer was not reversible error and any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Whether cumulative trial errors required reversal | N/A | N/A | No — errors (if any) were either not prejudicial or harmless; conviction reinstated |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1998) (plain‑error review framework)
- In re Welfare of C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2000) (implying mens rea to avoid strict liability)
- State v. Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 2012) (mens rea analysis for possession statutes)
- State v. Benniefield, 678 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 2004) (no knowledge of location required for drug possession in school zone)
- State v. Garcia‑Gutierrez, 844 N.W.2d 519 (Minn. 2014) (mens rea attaches to underlying offense, not attendant circumstances)
- State v. Bookwalter, 541 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1995) (intent to penetrate is required for CSC)
- State v. Jones, 556 N.W.2d 903 (Minn. 1996) (harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard for constitutional error)
- Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (rule requiring clear congressional intent before imposing strict liability for conduct not obviously criminal)
- Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (verdict unattributable to error standard)
