State of Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community
695 F.3d 406
6th Cir.2012Background
- State of Michigan and Little Traverse sue Bay Mills to halt Vanderbilt casino for alleged violations of the Tribal‑State compact and state law.
- Bay Mills acquired ~40 acres in Vanderbilt (not on Bay Mills’ reservation, >100 miles away) and opened a small casino with 84 slot machines.
- Vanderbilt casino began operating November 3, 2010; district court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining gaming.
- Bay Mills asserts lack of standing and tribal immunity as defenses to the claims and argues the case implicates sovereign immunity and jurisdiction.
- Court analyzes standing, then subject‑matter jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii), tribal immunity, waivers/abrogations, and federal‑question jurisdiction.
- Court vacates the injunction and remands for proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs have standing to sue over the Vanderbilt casino. | Little Traverse showed competitive harm (lost customers) and injury to state via revenue sharing. | Bay Mills contends no injury-in-fact or redressable harm, undermining standing. | Standing found for Little Traverse and the State. |
| Whether § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) grants federal jurisdiction because the casino is not on Indian lands. | Plaintiffs argue § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) abrogates immunity and provides jurisdiction. | Complaints allege not on Indian lands; jurisdiction fails under § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii). | § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) does not provide jurisdiction here. |
| If § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) fails, can alternative § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) theories based on lands being on Indian lands or § 2719 succeed? | Vanderbilt located on Indian lands? and/or operation violates § 2719. | Pleadings show Vanderbilt not on lands acquired in trust; § 2719 not triggered. | No jurisdiction under alternative § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) theories. |
| Whether Bay Mills is immune from suit and if Congress or state statutes abrogate or waive immunity. | State relies on statutes (§ 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii), § 1166) to abrogate/waive immunity. | Immunity cannot be waived or abrogated absent unequivocal express language. | Immunity not abrogated or waived; tribe immune. |
| Whether remaining claims fall under federal question jurisdiction despite immunity issues. | Grable jurisdiction exists for the remaining federal questions. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires injury, causation, redressability)
- Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Engler, 304 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2002) (controls on jurisdiction under Regulatory Act; analogous context)
- Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (regulation of Indian activities outside lands; immunity considerations)
- Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005) (federalism/tribal regulation—extraterritorial enforcement limits)
- Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998) (tribal immunity is judicially created; waivers must be unequivocal)
- Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (tribal immunity abrogation/waiver requires unequivocal expression)
- Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505 (1991) (limits on states enforcing tribal regulation; liability of tribal officers)
- Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g, 545 U.S. 308 (2005) (federal jurisdiction where federal issue is substantial and embedded in state claim)
- Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 181 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 1999) (abrogation/waiver analysis under § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) contrasted)