State of Maine v. Walter A. Parker, 156 A.3d 118

Background

Walter A. Parker pleaded guilty to three counts of gross sexual assault (Class A) and two counts of unlawful sexual contact (Class B) for multiple sexual assaults of a nine‑year‑old over an extended period.
At initial sentencing the court set a 22‑year term (all but 14 years suspended) and 18 years probation, effectively producing prolonged state supervision.
The court later determined that probation was not authorized for gross sexual assault of a child under 12 and ordered resentencing under statutory provisions requiring a definite term of imprisonment (at least 20 years) followed immediately by supervised release.
On resentencing the court set a 20‑year definite term of imprisonment and a 15‑year period of supervised release with conditions (monitoring, sex‑offender treatment, residence restrictions, no contact with victim).
Parker appealed, arguing the supervised‑release scheme violated due process, double jeopardy, and that mandatory supervised release altered the traditional three‑step (Hewey) sentencing analysis to his detriment.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Parker)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Due process: statute punishes status/characteristics rather than conduct	Supervised‑release scheme targets violent sex offenders for open‑ended sanctions and therefore violates due process	Statute addresses offense characteristics (victim <12) and sentencing information was reliable; no deprivation of procedural protections	Rejected—no due‑process violation; claim is effectively a proportionality challenge and sentence not grossly disproportionate
Double jeopardy: supervised release is a second punishment for same offense	Supervised release plus possible re‑incarceration punishes defendant twice for same conduct	Revocation sanctions punish breach of release conditions (a failure to abide by imposed conditions), not the original offense	Rejected—no double jeopardy violation; revocation punishment addresses breach of trust/conditions, not same offense
Mandatory supervised release vs. Hewey three‑step process	Mandatory minimum imprisonment and mandatory supervised release eliminate Step 3 (suspension/probation) and may increase prison exposure compared with Hewey	Statute governs sentencing; courts must follow Cook’s adapted analysis and consider sentencing purposes and factors when setting supervised release	Rejected—court properly applied statutory framework and Cook; no misapplication of law
Proportionality of combined imprisonment and supervised release	Combined effect (20 yrs + 15 yrs supervised release with possible re‑incarceration) is excessive	Prior precedents have upheld lengthy terms for multiple sexual assaults on minors; sentence is within constitutional bounds	Rejected—combination not unconstitutionally disproportionate in this case

Key Cases Cited

State v. Cook, 26 A.3d 834 (Me. 2011) (framework for imposing supervised release when statute bars suspension/probation)
State v. Bennett, 114 A.3d 994 (Me. 2015) (due process limits on sentencing information reliability)
State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151 (Me. 1993) (three‑step sentencing framework incorporated in statute)
State v. Sweet, 745 A.2d 368 (Me. 2000) (upholding lengthy sentences for multiple sexual assaults on minors)
State v. Holland, 34 A.3d 1130 (Me. 2012) (review standard for step one legal determinations)
State v. Ward, 21 A.3d 1033 (Me. 2011) (proportionality standard for Maine constitution)
State v. Harrell, 45 A.3d 732 (Me. 2012) (rule of lenity in ambiguous sentencing provisions)
State v. Grindle, 942 A.2d 673 (Me. 2008) (due process requirement that sentencing information be factually reliable)
State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265 (Me. 1995) (double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments)
State v. Farnham, 479 A.2d 887 (Me. 1984) (broad discretion in information sources at sentencing)