State of Maine v. Richard E. Murphy
130 A.3d 401
| Me. | 2016Background
- Defendant Richard E. Murphy was convicted by a jury of domestic violence assault with prior convictions (Class C) under 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(B)(1).
- The assault occurred March 20, 2014; victim testimony was minimal and she did not cooperate in prosecution.
- The only evidence of the parties’ relationship was testimony from a police officer that, about a year earlier, she observed Murphy and the victim engaging in consensual sexual intercourse in a basement.
- Murphy contested on appeal that the State failed to prove he and the victim were “sexual partners,” an element of the statutory definition of “family or household members” in 19-A M.R.S. § 4002(4).
- At trial the court left the factual question of whether they were sexual partners to the jury; Murphy did not seek a jury instruction defining the term or renew a Rule 29 motion on that ground.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether one isolated consensual sexual act can make parties “sexual partners” for § 4002(4) | State: Common meaning of “sexual partner” includes persons who engaged in a sexual act; one act suffices | Murphy: One incident of sex should not qualify as being sexual partners for domestic-violence status | Court: One consensual sexual act is sufficient; jury could find they were sexual partners |
| Standard of review for the statutory-element question | State: Sufficiency review with de novo statutory interpretation as needed | Murphy: Urged statutory-construction challenge (preserved?) | Court: Treated as sufficiency issue; reviewed evidence in light most favorable to State and construed statute consistent with verdict |
| Whether absence of jury instruction or preserved statutory challenge was reversible error | State: No obvious error given verdict and statutory construction | Murphy: Argued trial court should have defined “sexual partner” or treated as pure statutory question | Court: No obvious error; issue tied to sufficiency, not forfeited in a way that requires reversal |
| Whether construing “sexual partners” to include a single sexual act makes the term surplusage or conflicts with other relationships in § 4002(4) | State: Single-act definition is consistent with statutory scheme and common meaning | Murphy: Implicitly argued term should require more enduring relationship | Court: Requiring multiple acts or commitment would render term redundant; single-act construction harmonizes statute |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Cote, 118 A.3d 805 (Me. 2015) (standard for viewing evidence on sufficiency review)
- State v. Lowden, 87 A.3d 694 (Me. 2014) (de novo review of statute when assessing sufficiency)
- State v. Jones, 46 A.3d 1125 (Me. 2012) (sufficiency review principles)
- State v. Severy, 8 A.3d 715 (Me. 2010) (plain-meaning statutory interpretation)
- State v. Okie, 987 A.2d 495 (Me. 2010) (use of phrase “sexual partner” in Maine opinions)
- McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043 (Me. 1998) (use of “sexual partners” in context of disease-transmission duty)
- State v. Metzger, 999 A.2d 947 (Me. 2010) (proof must show sexual relationship or indicia of household status; distinguished here)
- State v. Nugent, 917 A.2d 127 (Me. 2007) (insufficient evidence where only testimony showed past boyfriend/girlfriend status)
- State v. Pabon, 28 A.3d 1147 (Me. 2011) (obvious-error review for jury-instruction or preserved statutory issues)