154 A.3d 127
Me.2017Background
- In Aug. 2014 police stopped Raymond N. Rourke III for speeding, observed signs of intoxication, arrested him for OUI, and obtained an Intoxilyzer 8000 breath result of .11 g/210 L.
- Rourke had told officers he was a mechanic and had been working that evening; the defense later claimed he had been exposed to automotive hydrocarbons, ketones, and toluene.
- Rourke proffered expert Patrick Demers (pharmacy/forensic chemistry) to testify that inhalation of certain hydrocarbons can produce falsely elevated Intoxilyzer readings.
- The State moved to exclude that testimony under M.R. Evid. 403; the court held a voir dire and excluded Demers’s opinion about interferent chemicals affecting the breath test.
- The court found Demers’s supporting experiments were old, used earlier Intoxilyzer models (4011/5000), involved direct inhalation in lab settings (paint thinner), and lacked peer-reviewed support or a factual link showing Rourke’s degree of exposure.
- A jury convicted Rourke; he appealed arguing the court abused its discretion by excluding the expert (and, insofar preserved, that overlapping officer testimony was cumulative). The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Rourke's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of expert testimony that hydrocarbons could produce falsely elevated Intoxilyzer results | Demers should be allowed to testify that exposure to hydrocarbons/ketones/toluene could have compromised Rourke’s breath test result | Demers’s opinion is unreliable and irrelevant because his studies involved different Intoxilyzer models and lacked factual linkage to Rourke’s exposure | Court did not abuse discretion excluding the opinion: studies not factually similar, expert not familiar with Intoxilyzer 8000, and insufficient proof of Rourke’s exposure |
| Sixth Amendment compulsory process claim for exclusion of defense expert | Excluding Demers infringed Rourke’s right to present a defense | Exclusion was an evidentiary ruling within discretion; compulsory process not violated under facts | Court held exclusion under Maine Rules of Evidence did not violate compulsory process right |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Fay, 130 A.3d 364 (ME 2015) (standard for viewing evidence in light most favorable to the State)
- State v. Diana, 89 A.3d 132 (Me. 2014) (abuse-of-discretion review for expert-admissibility rulings)
- State v. Ericson, 13 A.3d 777 (Me. 2011) (Rule 702 reliability and relevance indicia for expert testimony)
- Boutilier v. State, 426 A.2d 876 (Me. 1981) (inadmissible expert testimony lacks probative value)
- State v. Hatt, 810 A.2d 415 (Me. 2002) (expert excluded when offer of proof insufficient to show relevance)
- State v. Collin, 441 A.2d 693 (Me. 1982) (expert testimony properly excluded absent record link to defendant)
- State v. Tellier, 526 A.2d 941 (Me. 1987) (expert testimony too speculative is properly excluded)
- State v. Cross, 732 A.2d 278 (Me. 1999) (Sixth Amendment compulsory-process limits)
- State v. Williams, 462 A.2d 491 (Me. 1983) (requirements for a proper offer of proof)
