State of Maine v. Randall Daluz, 143 A.3d 800

Background

In August 2012 three people (Borders, Lugdon, Tuscano) were found shot and burned in a Pontiac; Sexton (white) rented the car and drove; Daluz (Black) traveled with Sexton that weekend and did not testify at trial.
Sexton and Daluz were tried jointly on three murder counts and one arson count after the State agreed not to introduce certain incriminating statements by Daluz that would have raised Bruton issues.
Sexton testified at trial, implicating Daluz and giving a self-serving account; Daluz presented witnesses but did not testify.
During Sexton’s counsel’s closing argument, counsel made remarks that defense later characterized as (1) commenting on Daluz’s decision not to testify and (2) invoking race-based themes (e.g., “white guy in Bangor,” reference to Daluz’s “friends in Brockton”).
Daluz objected only briefly after closing, declined a curative instruction and did not move for mistrial; after conviction he moved for a new trial alleging prejudicial joinder and improper closing remarks.
The trial court denied the new-trial motion (finding plain error as to race-comments but no effect on substantial rights; harmless error as to silence-comments). The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Daluz)	Defendant's Argument (State / Sexton)	Held
Prejudicial joinder / severance	Joint trial prejudiced Daluz because Sexton’s closing argument impermissibly attacked Daluz and exploited his silence/race	Trial court reasonably denied severance pretrial; no renewed motion during trial; joinder is presumptively appropriate	Court: No abuse of discretion in denying severance; trial conduct after ruling does not retroactively establish error in pretrial joinder decision
Comments on defendant’s silence	Sexton’s counsel’s repeated references (e.g., asking how Daluz would “explain”) impermissibly commented on Daluz’s decision not to testify and violated Fifth Amendment protections	Remarks were ambiguous, tied to Sexton’s competing version, and defense counsel strategically waived curative instruction and mistrial	Court: Defendant’s right to silence is protected against co‑defendant counsel, but here no obvious error—comments were ambiguous, defense waived curative relief, and no reasonable probability of a different outcome
Race-related argument	Closing comments invoked race and invoked stereotypes (friends in Brockton, “white guy in Bangor”) to suggest Daluz was more likely to carry guns or have violent associates	Remarks were improper but attenuated; jury instructions, voir dire on race, and context diminished prejudice; no evidence introduced tying race to wrongdoing	Court: Race-related remarks were improper (plain error) but did not affect Daluz’s substantial rights; no new trial warranted
Preservation and standard of review	Many comments were first raised post-verdict; trial court should nonetheless grant new trial given cumulative prejudice	Objections were not timely or did not request relief; review limited to obvious/plain error and abuse of discretion for new-trial decision	Court: Unpreserved claims reviewed for obvious/plain error affecting substantial rights; trial court’s denial of new trial reviewed for abuse of discretion and was affirmed

Key Cases Cited

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (establishes exclusion concerns when a co‑defendant’s out‑of‑court statements implicate another defendant)
Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift‑Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (trial judge’s superior vantage point justifies deference to post‑verdict rulings)
State v. Dana, 406 A.2d 83 (Me. 1979) (deference to trial court’s sense of trial fairness)
State v. Dolloff, 58 A.3d 1032 (Me. 2012) (timeliness requirement for objections to closing argument)
State v. Robinson, 134 A.3d 828 (Me. 2016) (obvious/plain error standard for unpreserved claims)
State v. Boucher, 718 A.2d 1092 (Me. 1998) (trial court discretion on severance)
State v. Lyons, 718 A.2d 1102 (Me. 1998) (prosecutorial comment on silence reviewed for harmless error)