234 A.3d 230
Me.2020Background
- In June 2009, Nicholas Westgate committed five incidents of unlawful sexual contact and one incident of visual sexual aggression against an 11‑year‑old victim. He was indicted in 2012 on five Class B unlawful sexual contact counts and one Class C visual sexual aggression count.
- First trial (May 2014): jury convicted on all counts; this Court vacated the verdict in 2016 because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on elements (including the victim’s age).
- Second trial (May 2017): jury deadlocked and mistrial declared.
- Third trial (October 2018): trial court admitted an expert to explain forensic interviewing of child victims (not the victim’s veracity); court gave lesser‑included offense instructions (unlawful sexual contact against person under 14); jury asked whether to consider the under‑14 charge if they could not agree on under‑12, and the court answered yes.
- Jury returned unanimous guilty verdicts on all six counts; Westgate was sentenced and then appealed, arguing (1) the verdict was ambiguous, (2) prosecutorial misconduct, and (3) erroneous admission of expert testimony. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Westgate) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the jury verdict was ambiguous | Verdicts as read correspond to the indicted (named) counts; jurors were properly instructed. | The verdict could be ambiguous because jurors may have returned verdicts as to lesser‑included (under‑14) offenses instead of the named counts. | No error: court’s answers to jury questions and the polling transcript showed jurors understood they were addressing the named counts. |
| Whether prosecutor engaged in misconduct (vouching during closing) | Prosecutor may comment on consistency of testimony; no improper vouching occurred. | Prosecutor vouched for witness credibility by asserting consistent age statements. | No misconduct: commenting on consistency is permissible and not improper vouching. |
| Whether prosecutor’s cross‑examination about funeral attendance was improper | Question aimed to show defendant knew of the mother’s death; any impropriety was insignificant and cured. | Question was irrelevant and improper (about attending victim’s mother’s funeral). | Harmless/insignificant: defendant gave an innocent explanation and withdrew curative request; no prejudice shown. |
| Whether admission of expert testimony on forensic interviewing was erroneous | Expert testimony was relevant, the witness was qualified, and testimony would assist the jury (without opining on veracity). | Testimony risked implying the victim was credible and was unfairly prejudicial. | Admission affirmed: trial court found threshold reliability, relevancy, and limited testimony so it would not address veracity; no abuse of discretion. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Westgate, 148 A.3d 716 (Me. 2016) (prior opinion vacating first trial verdict for deficient jury instructions)
- State v. Dolloff, 58 A.3d 1032 (Me. 2012) (standard for plain/obvious error review and harmful error analysis)
- State v. Schofield, 895 A.2d 927 (Me. 2005) (preservation and review principles)
- Clewley v. Whitney, 794 A.2d 87 (Me. 2002) (verdict clarity and jury polling)
- United States v. Cannon, 903 F.2d 849 (1st Cir. 1990) (clarifies that jury questions and court responses can show whether verdicts refer to named counts)
- State v. Hassan, 82 A.3d 86 (Me. 2013) (prosecutorial vouching limits)
- State v. Maine, 155 A.3d 871 (Me. 2017) (expert testimony admissibility standards)
- State v. Ericson, 13 A.3d 777 (Me. 2011) (threshold indicia of expert reliability)
- State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154 (Me. 1988) (permitting expert testimony to explain inconsistencies in timing/sequencing of victim testimony)