State of Maine v. Mark Cardilli Jr., 254 A.3d 415

Early morning physical altercation at the Cardilli family home: Mark Cardilli shot and killed Isahak Muse after a confrontation in which Muse (unarmed) and Cardilli exchanged punches; Muse had been permitted to be in the home by Cardilli’s parents.
Cardilli retrieved a gun during the disturbance and shot Muse at ~1:43 a.m.; Muse’s autopsy showed two contact entrance gunshot wounds; Muse had a high BAC.
A jury-waived bench trial found the killing was voluntary and knowing; the court found Cardilli actually believed deadly force was necessary but that those beliefs were objectively unreasonable.
Trial court applied 17-A M.R.S. § 101(3) (imperfect self-defense) and § 108(2)(B) (defense of dwelling) and convicted Cardilli of manslaughter (Class A) rather than murder.
On appeal Cardilli argued the State had to prove his beliefs were not only unreasonable but also a "gross deviation" (reckless) and that the court erred by not analyzing § 108(2)(A) (imminent deadly force).
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed: the 2008 amendment to § 101(3) removed the prior "gross deviation" requirement, and the § 108(2)(A) theory was waived (and, alternatively, unsupported).

Issue	State's Argument	Cardilli's Argument	Held
Whether, under § 101(3), the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant's unreasonable belief was a "gross deviation" (reckless) to support a manslaughter conviction.	The 2008 amendment to § 101(3) eliminated the "gross deviation" precondition; State need only prove the defendant's belief was not reasonable.	Precedent (e.g., Smith) required proof that the belief was grossly deviant/reckless; the State failed to prove that higher standard.	The amendment removed the gross-deviation requirement; the State need only prove the belief was unreasonable; trial court correctly applied § 101(3).
Whether the trial court erred in failing to analyze self-defense under § 108(2)(A) (belief Muse was about to use deadly force).	Cardilli waived the claim by not requesting § 108(2)(A); even if considered, the facts did not support an objectively reasonable belief Muse was about to use deadly force.	The court should have considered § 108(2)(A) because Cardilli could have reasonably believed Muse would use deadly force (e.g., grab the gun).	Court held Cardilli waived the issue; alternatively, the record shows Muse was unarmed, asked for his phone, and did not try to take the gun, so any belief that deadly force was imminent was objectively unreasonable.

State v. Fournier, 203 A.3d 801 (Me. 2019) (deference to trial court factual findings).
State v. Smith, 472 A.2d 948 (Me. 1984) (articulated "gross deviation" standard for imperfect self-defense under earlier statute).
State v. Ouellette, 37 A.3d 921 (Me. 2012) (clarified that a valid § 108 self-defense is a complete defense).
State v. Neild, 903 A.2d 339 (Me. 2006) (license/consent to enter premises governs § 108/§ 104 analysis).
State v. Harding, 392 A.2d 538 (Me. 1978) (defined "surreptitiously remaining").
State v. Hanaman, 38 A.3d 1278 (Me. 2012) (discussed imperfect self-defense consequences).
State v. Nadeau, 920 A.2d 452 (Me. 2007) (standard of review: view evidence in light most favorable to State when testing sufficiency of proof of justification).