State of Maine v. Kyle A. Chase, 294 A.3d 154

Victim and defendant (Chase) were family/household members; on Oct 10, 2021 Chase allegedly strangled the victim, dragged her from a car, slammed her face into the steering wheel, and pushed/grabbed her in other incidents.
Chase was indicted on five counts: aggravated assault (strangulation), robbery, domestic violence assault, domestic violence criminal threatening, and theft by unauthorized taking/transfer.
After a jury trial Chase was convicted on all five counts; the court set a basic sentence and imposed five years with all but 24 months suspended, plus three years probation on the aggravated assault count (concurrent sentences on others).
Chase appealed raising three primary issues: (1) failure to give a specific unanimity instruction, (2) failure to merge duplicative counts (double jeopardy), and (3) whether the court impermissibly considered his insistence on a trial when imposing sentence.
The Court affirmed the convictions but held the trial court plainly erred by not merging robbery and theft counts (they are duplicative) and remanded for merger and resentencing because of ambiguous sentencing remarks about Chase’s decision to go to trial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a specific unanimity instruction was required	State: No; general unanimity and separate-count instructions were sufficient; only one incident implicated aggravated assault.	Chase: Multiple incidents could support each count so jurors needed a specific unanimity instruction to ensure they agreed on the same incident.	No error — specific unanimity instruction not required here; evidence did not generate need for it; no new trial.
Whether duplicative counts should be merged (double jeopardy)	State: Conceded robbery and theft are duplicative and should merge; domestic-violence assault need not merge with aggravated assault.	Chase: Counts 1 & 3 and Counts 2 & 5 are duplicative and must be merged to avoid double punishment.	Court: Robbery (Count 2) and theft (Count 5) must be merged; aggravated assault (Count 1) and domestic violence assault (Count 3) are not duplicative under Blockburger, so no merger for those counts.
Whether sentencing relied improperly on defendant’s insistence on trial	State: Court may consider credibility, remorse, and conduct at trial; not merely the decision to go to trial.	Chase: Court increased sentence because he insisted on a trial, which is unconstitutional.	Ambiguous sentencing remarks reasonably suggest the court may have punished him for insisting on trial; any doubt resolved for defendant — sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing.

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (establishes test for determining whether two offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes)
State v. Armstrong, 237 A.3d 185 (Me. 2020) (merger is the proper remedy for duplicative convictions; preserve verdicts but only one sentence)
State v. Fortune, 34 A.3d 1115 (Me. 2011) (discusses general verdicts and when specific unanimity instructions are appropriate)
State v. Moore, 290 A.3d 533 (Me. 2023) (clarifies that exercising the right to trial cannot be cited as an aggravating factor and resolves sentencing-review standards)
State v. Osborn, 290 A.3d 558 (Me. 2023) (specific unanimity instructions required when State alleges multiple independent instances any one of which could support conviction)
State v. Grindle, 942 A.2d 673 (Me. 2008) (a court may consider a defendant’s untruthful testimony and lack of remorse as part of sentencing)