State of Maine v. Justin G. Pillsbury, 161 A.3d 690

In Nov. 2013, Justin Pillsbury (41) and his girlfriend (24) were drinking at his friend’s apartment; a dispute over her phone escalated and Pillsbury stabbed her multiple times; she died of stab wounds.
Pillsbury told the friend and paramedics he had killed her and attempted suicide; in a recorded police interview he admitted stabbing her because of jealousy and denied self‑defense; he was indicted for murder.
At trial, the State argued jealousy motivated the killing; Pillsbury asserted self‑defense and testified he only sought to neutralize a threat.
During opening, the prosecutor described jealousy as an “uncaged green‑eyed monster”; defense later moved for mistrial alleging prejudicial/racial overtones; court barred referring to Pillsbury as a “monster” in closing and instructed jurors that statements are not evidence.
The State introduced a witness who testified to a prior incident in which Pillsbury, jealous, physically assaulted the victim; defense objected under M.R. Evid. 404(b) and 403.
Jury convicted Pillsbury of intentional/knowing or depraved‑indifference murder; trial court denied his motion for a new trial; conviction affirmed on appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Pillsbury)	Held
Whether prosecutor’s “uncaged green‑eyed monster” remark and related rhetoric constituted prosecutorial misconduct requiring a new trial	Comment was permissible rhetorical flourish explaining motive and did not invite verdict on non‑evidentiary grounds; court remedied concerns by limiting further language and instructing jury	Remark was inflammatory, carried racial overtones, and unfairly prejudiced the jury	No misconduct requiring reversal; instructions and court admonition cured any potential prejudice; harmless error given strong evidence
Whether testimony about prior assault (prior bad act) was admissible under M.R. Evid. 404(b) and not excluded by Rule 403	Prior incident was probative of motive, intent, and relationship; proper to rebut self‑defense theory; probative value not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice	Prior‑acts testimony was character evidence and unduly prejudicial under Rules 404(b)/403	Admission was proper: evidence went to motive/intent and relationship; trial court did not clearly err or abuse discretion in admitting it

State v. Morrison, 135 A.3d 343 (Me. 2016) (standard for viewing evidence in light most favorable to State)
State v. Dolloff, 58 A.3d 1032 (Me. 2012) (review and harmless‑error framework for prosecutorial misconduct)
State v. Weisbrode, 653 A.2d 411 (Me. 1995) (permissible range of rhetoric in prosecutor argument)
Steadman v. Pagels, 125 A.3d 713 (Me. 2015) (review standards for admission of prior bad acts under Rule 404(b))
State v. Hassan, 82 A.3d 86 (Me. 2013) (Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 principles)
State v. Pratt, 130 A.3d 381 (Me. 2015) (prior abuse admissible to show motive/relationship)
State v. Lockhart, 830 A.2d 433 (Me. 2003) (opening statements can place issues before jury)
State v. Gorman, 854 A.2d 1164 (Me. 2004) (affirmance may rest on alternative proper legal grounds)
State v. Donovan, 698 A.2d 1045 (Me. 1997) (limits on using opening statements to justify admission of collateral prior conduct)
State v. Hurd, 360 A.2d 525 (Me. 1976) (definition of unfair prejudice under Rule 403)