281 A.3d 651
Me.2022Background
- An Amtrak conductor reported that on Dec. 23, 2019 Joshua Lovell and a companion made a quick round trip from Portland to Haverhill, appeared "high" on the return trip, and a suspected crack pipe was later found on their seat. The conductor’s report was recorded in Amtrak’s internal database and corroborated by travel records showing similar quick trips earlier in December.
- An Amtrak detective relayed those reports to MDEA Special Agent Morrison, who learned Lovell had prior involvement in drug incidents and noted Lovell’s address was north of Portland.
- The conductor alerted police that Lovell was scheduled to make another short round trip on Jan. 11, 2020, this time accompanied by a child; Morrison observed a man matching Lovell’s license exit the terminal with a child, get into a Honda Civic, and he directed officers to stop the vehicle on the I‑295 ramp.
- Evidence discovered during the vehicle stop produced a grand jury indictment charging aggravated trafficking of fentanyl, possession of cocaine, endangering a child, and violating a condition of release.
- Lovell moved to suppress, arguing (1) testimony about the conductor’s out‑of‑court statements was inadmissible hearsay and violated the Confrontation Clause, and (2) Morrison lacked an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the stop. The suppression motion was denied.
- Lovell entered conditional guilty pleas preserving his suppression appeal; the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of suppression and the convictions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lovell) | Defendant's Argument (State/Morrison) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of conductor’s out‑of‑court statements at suppression hearing (hearsay) | Conductor’s statements were offered for their truth (that Lovell was high and a crack pipe was found) and thus are inadmissible hearsay. | Statements were offered to show the basis for Morrison’s articulable suspicion (not to prove truth); such out‑of‑court statements are admissible for that purpose if they bear indicia of reliability. | Court: Not hearsay when used to show the officer’s basis for suspicion; conductor’s information had sufficient indicia of reliability. |
| Confrontation Clause violation from admitting conductor’s statements | Admission of testimonial out‑of‑court statements without cross‑examination violated Lovell’s Sixth Amendment rights. | Statements were non‑hearsay evidence of the officer’s state of mind and not testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes. | Court: No Confrontation violation because the statements were not hearsay and thus the Clause did not apply. |
| Whether Morrison had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle | Travel and conduct consistent with a drug courier profile are innocent conduct; such profile factors alone cannot support reasonable suspicion. | Totality of circumstances — prior short trips, conductor’s report of intoxication and a crack pipe, MDEA information about prior drug involvement, corroboration of travel and identity, and the imminent short stop with a child — supplied the ‘‘more’’ needed to elevate a profile‑based hunch to reasonable suspicion. | Court: Under the totality of the circumstances Morrison had objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle; suppression denial affirmed. |
| Use of a "drug courier profile" as basis for suspicion | Reliance on profile characteristics risks only producing an unsubstantiated hunch and cannot alone justify a seizure. | A profile can be a starting point; when corroborated and combined with reliable, particularized information it can support reasonable suspicion. | Court: Consistent with precedent — profile factors alone are insufficient, but here they were corroborated and joined by other reliable facts, so suspicion was reasonable. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Akers, 259 A.3d 127 (Me. 2021) (standard for viewing suppression hearing facts in defendant’s favor)
- State v. Vaughan, 974 A.2d 930 (Me. 2009) (rules on hearsay at suppression hearings and indicia of reliability)
- State v. Sylvain, 814 A.2d 984 (Me. 2003) (reasonable, articulable suspicion standard for investigatory stops)
- Poole v. State, 551 A.2d 108 (Me. 1988) (out‑of‑court statements admissible to show probable cause or articulable suspicion)
- Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014) (informant veracity and corroboration in reasonable suspicion analysis)
- Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (discussion of drug courier profile as descriptive concept)
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge factors for informant tips)
- Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020) (officer may rely on reasonable inferences drawn from facts to support suspicion)