State of Maine v. Joseph M. Solomon II, 120 A.3d 661

On March 8, 2013, while jury selection was underway in Superior Court on a separate charge, defendant Joseph M. Solomon II held up a handwritten sign reading “Please don’t let them railroad your Veterans” toward the pool of 25–30 potential jurors, then discarded it.
One potential juror reported the incident; four potential jurors were later interviewed and identified seeing the sign. Solomon was arrested the next day and indicted.
The State charged four counts of tampering with a juror under 17-A M.R.S. § 454(1-A)(A) and one count of violating a condition of release; Solomon pleaded not guilty and moved to dismiss, arguing “juror” does not include members of the jury pool who have not been selected.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, ruled that lay witnesses could testify about their impressions of Solomon’s intent, and instructed the jury that “juror” includes persons called for jury duty including jury selection.
The jury convicted Solomon on the four tampering counts; the court (bench trial) found him guilty of violating a condition of release. Solomon appealed, challenging the indictment’s sufficiency, the court’s definition of “juror,” and admission of lay opinion testimony.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether “juror” in the jury-tampering statute includes potential jurors in the jury pool	State: statute covers persons called for jury duty and those in position to influence jurors; broader definition avoids absurd results	Solomon: “juror” should mean only those already selected to serve; pool members are not jurors	Court: “juror” includes persons called for jury duty (jury pool); denied motion to dismiss
Whether court erred by defining “juror” for the jury rather than leaving it to jury factfinding	State: statutory interpretation is a question of law for the court	Solomon: definition is factual and should be decided by jury	Court: definition is a legal question; court properly instructed jury and left factual application to jurors
Admissibility of lay witnesses’ opinion testimony about Solomon’s intent	State: lay impressions rationally based on perceptions and helpful to jurors	Solomon: such opinion testimony impermissibly opines on intent	Court: testimony admissible under M.R. Evid. 701; witnesses’ perceptions aided understanding; no obvious error
Whether alleged vagueness of “juror” violates due process	State: statutory language gives adequate notice; reasonable construction suffices	Solomon: ambiguous term is void for vagueness	Court: not unconstitutionally vague; statute affords sufficient notice

State v. Elliott, 987 A.2d 513 (statutory construction and elements of offense)
Daggett v. Sternick, 109 A.3d 1137 (plain-meaning statutory interpretation controls)
State v. Mourino, 104 A.3d 893 (avoid absurd or unreasonable statutory results)
State v. Hofland, 58 A.3d 1023 (review of jury instructions for prejudicial error)
Caruso v. Jackson Lab., 98 A.3d 221 (prejudice requirement for erroneous jury instructions)
State v. Lovejoy, 89 A.3d 1066 (obvious-error standard explained)
Sunshine v. Brett, 106 A.3d 1123 (statutory interpretation is for courts, not juries)
State v. Perkins, 107 A.3d 636 (preservation and obvious-error review)
State v. Reckards, 113 A.3d 589 (void-for-vagueness principles)