State of Maine v. Jonathan M. Carey
2013 ME 83
| Me. | 2013Background
- In summer 2008 Jonathan M. Carey (then his girlfriend’s boyfriend) allegedly entered a bedroom during a girls’ sleepover and touched a 12–13-year-old victim sexually; the victim later reported the incident a year after it occurred.
- Carey was indicted on counts for unlawful sexual contact and unlawful sexual touching relating to the victim and two counts relating to the daughter who lived in the home; Carey pleaded not guilty.
- First trial ended in mistrial when a State witness invoked the Fifth Amendment during testimony, preventing cross-examination; court declared mistrial for manifest necessity.
- At the second trial the daughter testified incompletely, became emotionally unavailable, and refused further testimony; the State sought to admit her first-trial testimony under M.R. Evid. 804 as an unavailable witness; defense objected on Confrontation Clause grounds.
- The court (Murphy, J.) declared a mistrial in the second trial after concluding the confrontation problem could not be remedied and noting the defense declined to have the witness return; Carey did not object to that mistrial at the time.
- Third trial proceeded on the counts related to the victim only; Carey was convicted. He moved for a new trial alleging prosecutorial misconduct (prosecutor’s head/hand gestures during cross-examination) and also raised other alleged misstatements on appeal; the trial court denied the new-trial motion and Carey appealed. Judgment affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Carey) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether mistrial in second trial was erroneous and barred retrial by double jeopardy | Implied consent and no double jeopardy bar because defendant did not timely object; alternatives were not feasible | Mistrial improper because Carey did not move for it, was deprived of control over course of case, and alternatives existed; retrial violates double jeopardy | Affirmed: No obvious error — Carey impliedly consented to mistrial by conduct and silence; retrial not barred (no intentional prosecutorial misconduct) |
| Whether prosecutorial nonverbal gestures during third trial require new trial for misconduct | Gestures were inadvertent, intended for counsel preparation, and did not influence witness; trial court reasonably found no improper communication | Gestures constituted vouching/coaching of witness, could have been seen by jury and prejudiced outcome; new trial required | Affirmed: Trial court did not abuse discretion; record does not show prosecutor coached witness or that gestures prejudiced trial; no obvious error on appeal |
| Whether court should have sua sponte limited alleged misstatements by prosecutor in closing and rebuttal | Statements were not so plainly erroneous to trigger reversal; no timely objection made | Prosecutor misstated law and facts in closing/rebuttal and court should have intervened to prevent prejudice | No obvious error; appellate review finds insufficient merit and Carey failed to preserve the issue |
| Standard of appellate review for unpreserved errors | Unobjected issues reviewed for obvious error; new-trial denial reviewed for abuse of discretion/clear error | Same | Applied: obvious-error standard for unpreserved claims; denial of new trial reviewed for abuse of discretion/clear error |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Woodard, 68 A.3d 1250 (Me. 2013) (standard for obvious error review in criminal appeals)
- State v. Beaudoin, 600 A.2d 1097 (Me. 1991) (failure to object can constitute implied consent to mistrial, permitting retrial)
- United States v. DiPietro, 936 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1991) (defendant’s conduct may constitute effectual consent to mistrial)
- State v. Lewis, 816 A.2d 823 (Me. 2003) (abuse-of-discretion review for mistrial declared for manifest necessity)
- United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1991) (isolated prosecutorial nonverbal reactions do not necessarily render trial fundamentally unfair)
- State v. Carr, 58 A.3d 1102 (Me. 2012) (standard for reviewing denial of motion for new trial)
