State of Maine v. Jody B. Flynn, 127 A.3d 1239

In late 2009 a $500,000 exclusivity deposit from Charmwell/Dinson was wired into Green Tree’s bank account; Flynn managed Green Tree’s finances.
After the Domtar mill sale fell through, Flynn acknowledged by email an obligation to return the deposit but transferred most of the funds from Green Tree to her personal and other business accounts instead of repaying the prospective purchasers.
Bert Martin (partner in Green Tree) ultimately repaid the purchasers and later sued Flynn in a civil action; civil discovery (including Flynn’s depositions and bank records) was produced to the State and made available to Flynn in the criminal case.
Flynn was indicted (single-count) for Class B theft by unauthorized taking or transfer (alleging a scheme from Dec. 7, 2009 to Jan. 27, 2010) naming Green Tree, Dinson, or Charmwell as victims.
At trial the State introduced emails between Flynn and purchaser representatives and Flynn testified that she had sought legal advice; the jury convicted Flynn and the court sentenced her to four years (all but nine months suspended) and probation.
Flynn appealed, arguing insufficiency of the evidence, improper admission/use of emails, a flawed advice-of-counsel instruction, denial of a bill of particulars, and that the indictment was duplicitous.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Flynn)	Held
Sufficiency of evidence	Evidence showed Flynn converted funds belonging to others and exceeded $10,000	Flynn argued the evidence did not prove theft beyond a reasonable doubt	Guilty verdict affirmed; evidence sufficient to prove unauthorized control and intent
Admission/use of emails	Emails were admissible to show context and Flynn’s own statements (not hearsay if offered against her)	Emails from third parties were hearsay and improperly admitted for truth	Emails admissible: Flynn’s statements admissible under admissions; others were offered for context and limited by instruction
Advice-of-counsel instruction	No entitlement to instruction because defendant did not meet prima facie requirements	Flynn claimed court shifted burden by requiring preponderance to show full disclosure to counsel	Flynn failed to establish the defense; any instructional error harmless because defense not generated
Bill of particulars / duplicitous indictment	Single-count charging a scheme affecting multiple related entities was proper	Flynn claimed uncertainty as to victim identity and that indictment was duplicitous for naming three victims	Denial of bill of particulars upheld; indictment not duplicitous—single scheme/theft from related interests may be charged in one count

State v. Reed, 58 A.3d 1130 (Me. 2013) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence in criminal conviction)
State v. Schmidt, 957 A.2d 80 (Me. 2008) (conversion/misuse of entrusted funds supports theft conviction)
State v. Myers, 407 A.2d 307 (Me. 1979) (single-count theft may encompass takings from multiple owners in one transaction)
United States v. Powers, 702 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (requirements for advice-of-counsel defense and when instruction is unavailable)
United States v. Gonzales, 58 F.3d 506 (10th Cir. 1995) (reliance on counsel does not negate mens rea absent full disclosure)
United States v. Gorski, 36 F. Supp. 3d 256 (D. Mass. 2014) (describing burden of production for advice-of-counsel and interplay with prosecution’s burden)
State v. Lavigne, 588 A.2d 741 (Me. 1991) (aggregating thefts from different sources for enhancement when part of a common scheme)
State v. Fournier, 617 A.2d 998 (Me. 1992) (aggregation/multiplicity principles in theft prosecutions)