159 A.3d 831
Me.2017Background
- On July 17, 2013, Jason Cote went to the victim’s trailer; after an argument about the victim’s dealings with federal investigators, Cote bludgeoned the victim to death with a metal pipe.
- Cote was indicted for murder and proceeded to trial; he claimed self-defense at trial.
- Law enforcement interviewed Cote on July 18 (in a police cruiser near a friend’s home), July 23 (acquaintance’s home), and July 24 (grandparents’ house); Miranda warnings were not given until after 12:44 p.m. on July 18 and never before the July 23 and 24 interviews.
- The motion court suppressed statements made after 12:44 p.m. on July 18 for Miranda purposes but denied suppression of statements made before that time and those made on July 23 and 24, concluding those later statements were noncustodial and not tainted.
- At trial the State elicited medical-examiner testimony that the victim suffered a hinge fracture consistent with heavy force to a stationary head — the examiner said stomping was a very possible mechanism; the prosecutor repeatedly argued the jury could infer stomping.
- The jury convicted Cote of murder; he appealed, raising (1) partial denial of his suppression motion, (2) alleged prosecutorial misconduct concerning repeated references to stomping, and (3) insufficiency of evidence to disprove self-defense.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Cote was in custody before 12:44 p.m. on July 18 such that Miranda warnings were required | Cote: the interview became custodial before 12:44 p.m.; statements before then should be suppressed | State: interview was voluntary, noncustodial until 12:44 p.m.; warnings not required earlier | Court: no error — reasonable person would not have felt in custody before 12:44 p.m.; suppression denial affirmed |
| Whether July 23 and 24 statements were tainted by the Miranda violation on July 18 | Cote: later noncustodial statements were tainted by the earlier unwarned interrogation and should be suppressed | State: July 18 violation was technical/voluntary and later statements were sufficiently attenuated in time, place, and scope | Court: no error — July 18 statements were voluntary and no substantial nexus to later statements; denial affirmed |
| Whether prosecutor committed misconduct by repeatedly stating Cote stomped on the victim | Cote: repeated references to stomping were unsupported and prejudicial | State: prosecutor’s inferences were fairly based on medical-examiner testimony linking hinge fracture to possible stomping | Court: no misconduct — comments were supported by evidence and permissible argument |
| Whether evidence was sufficient to convict of murder beyond a reasonable doubt | Cote: evidence did not disprove self-defense or support murder conviction | State: medical and other evidence supported intentional killing and disproved self-defense | Court: evidence sufficient; jury could rationally find murder and reject self-defense |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Pratt, 130 A.3d 381 (Me. 2015) (standard for viewing evidence in light most favorable to verdict)
- State v. Lovett, 109 A.3d 1135 (Me. 2015) (deference to motion court factual findings on suppression)
- State v. Bragg, 48 A.3d 769 (Me. 2012) (review standard for suppression rulings)
- State v. Dion, 928 A.2d 746 (Me. 2007) (custody is mixed question of law and fact; de novo review of custody determination)
- State v. Philbrick, 436 A.2d 844 (Me. 1981) (Miranda warnings required when in custody and subject to interrogation)
- State v. Williams, 15 A.3d 753 (Me. 2011) (interview in police cruiser near home was noncustodial)
- State v. Higgins, 796 A.2d 50 (Me. 2002) (consideration of interview conditions such as permitted breaks)
- State v. Michaud, 724 A.2d 1222 (Me. 1999) (factors to determine custody for Miranda)
- Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (post-Miranda statements need not be suppressed automatically; attenuation/voluntariness inquiry)
- United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405 (1st Cir. 1998) (test for substantial nexus and voluntariness after Miranda violation)
- United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1989) (voluntariness inquiry for unwarned statements)
- State v. Smith, 675 A.2d 93 (Me. 1996) (post-warning statements not tainted when initial unwarned statements were voluntary)
- State v. Dolloff, 58 A.3d 1032 (Me. 2012) (obvious-error review for unpreserved prosecutorial-misconduct claims)
- State v. Robinson, 124 A.3d 828 (Me. 2016) (prosecutor’s role; proper scope of argument)
- State v. Roberts, 951 A.2d 803 (Me. 2008) (prosecutor may argue any inference fairly based on evidence)
- State v. Ashley, 666 A.2d 103 (Me. 1995) (vigorous argument allowed where supported by evidence)
- State v. Moontri, 649 A.2d 315 (Me. 1994) (prosecutor may argue inferences contrary to defendant’s testimony)
- State v. Clark, 954 A.2d 1066 (Me. 2008) (standard for sufficiency of evidence review)
