State of Maine v. James E. Sweeney, 221 A.3d 130

Sweeney and W.D. were long-term partners; in spring 2017 Sweeney became increasingly jealous and exhibited alarming conduct (including an incident in March 2017 in which he woke W.D. with a gun in her bedroom).
W.D. told her mother soon after the March incident that Sweeney had pointed a gun at her and brought the gun to her mother’s house.
In June 2017 W.D. ended the relationship; on July 11, 2017 Sweeney entered her bedroom while she slept and fatally struck her with a wooden bat.
Sweeney was indicted for murder, pled not guilty and not criminally responsible by reason of insanity, waived a jury, and was tried by the court in Jan–Feb 2019.
The court admitted W.D.’s mother’s testimony about W.D.’s out‑of‑court statements under the present sense impression exception (M.R. Evid. 803(1)); the court later concluded the testimony was not an excited utterance but nonetheless admitted it—an evidentiary error the Court of Appeals deemed harmless.
The court convicted Sweeney and imposed a basic 35‑year term, then a final 38‑year sentence after weighing aggravating and mitigating factors; Sweeney appealed both the evidentiary ruling and his sentence.

Issue	State's Argument	Sweeney's Argument	Held
Admissibility of W.D.’s statements to her mother (hearsay)	Testimony admissible as present sense impression (and probative of relationship/reaction)	Admission was erroneous and prejudicial; hearsay exceptions did not apply	Court erred admitting under present sense impression; but error was harmless given abundant other evidence about relationship and conduct
Whether testimony qualified as an excited utterance	N/A (State did not press excited‑utterance ruling on appeal)	Argued statements were not admissible hearsay under any exception	Trial court found it was not an excited utterance; appellate court found that conclusion not clearly erroneous
Sentencing: whether court double‑counted domestic violence	Court properly considered domestic‑violence factors in setting basic term and again as an aggravating factor at step two	Court impermissibly double‑counted the same factor when setting basic and final sentence	No double‑counting; court permissibly considered objective violence in step one and relationship history as an aggravating factor at step two; weighing was within discretion
Due process challenge re: inconsistent treatment of Sweeney’s statements to experts	N/A	Alleged denial of meaningful opportunity to present a defense because similar statements were admitted differently	Argument unpreserved and unpersuasive; court not persuaded that constitutional violation occurred

State v. Guyette, 36 A.3d 916 (Me. 2012) (abuse of discretion review for hearsay rulings)
State v. Ryne G., 509 A.2d 1164 (Me. 1986) (substantial contemporaneity essential to present sense impression)
State v. Watts, 938 A.2d 21 (Me. 2007) (findings required for excited utterance admissibility)
State v. Fournier, 203 A.3d 801 (Me. 2019) (inference of trial court findings when no additional findings requested)
State v. White, 804 A.2d 1146 (Me. 2002) (harmless error standard)
State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151 (Me. 1993) (two‑step murder sentencing framework)
State v. Koehler, 46 A.3d 1134 (Me. 2012) (description of basic‑term and aggravating/mitigating step analysis)
State v. Lord, 208 A.3d 781 (Me. 2019) (domestic‑violence history may be an aggravating factor)
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (U.S. 2006) (defendant’s right to present a complete defense)