193 A.3d 168
Me.2018Background
- James A. Reynolds was indicted (Dec. 2016) and convicted after jury trial of multiple sex offenses arising from repeated sexual abuse of a girl from about age 9 to 16, including gross sexual assault, unlawful sexual contact, and sexual abuse of a minor. The indictment alleged one act per year from 1997–2002; one count was later dismissed pretrial.
- Victim testified to an ongoing, weekly pattern of abuse (manual, oral, and genital contact) beginning at age nine and continuing until age sixteen; only a few discrete episodes were described in detail.
- State sought and the trial court admitted limited references to uncharged acts (outside Oxford County) under M.R. Evid. 404(b); trial court prohibited detailed description of those incidents and the defense waived a limiting instruction.
- Defense moved for judgment of acquittal asserting (1) lack of specific-unanimity support for eight of eleven counts, (2) unfair prejudice from admission of uncharged acts, and (3) two counts (1997, 1998) were time‑barred by a six‑year statute of limitations. The motions were denied; Reynolds was convicted and sentenced and appealed.
- The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed: a properly instructed jury may convict on multiple counts supported by repetitive/generic testimony; admission of limited uncharged-conduct evidence was permissible; the 1999 legislative removal of the limitations defense applied retroactively to these juvenile-victim offenses.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Reynolds) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Specific unanimity for multiple counts | Generic, repetitive testimony of weekly abuse across years sufficed, if jury received specific-unanimity instruction | Generic testimony only identified three discrete incidents, so jury could not have unanimously found additional eight charged acts | Court affirmed: where jury is properly instructed, credible generic testimony describing repeated, indistinguishable acts can support unanimous convictions on multiple counts |
| Admission of uncharged sexual conduct | Limited references to extra-jurisdictional/uncharged acts were admissible under M.R. Evid. 404(b) to show relationship, opportunity, intent | Admission invited the jury to punish for uncharged conduct and was unfairly prejudicial | Court affirmed: evidence admissible to show relationship/pattern; defendant waived limiting-instruction objection and failed to seek joinder relief or bill of particulars |
| Statute of limitations for 1997–1998 counts | Prosecution timely because 1999 Legislature removed the limitations defense retroactively for victims under 16 where the six‑year period had not yet run | Counts were governed by pre‑1999 six‑year limitations and prosecution in 2016 was time‑barred | Court affirmed: 1999 amendment removed limitations defense retroactively here; prosecution not barred; ex post facto claim rejected per Stogner |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. DeLong, 505 A.2d 803 (Me. 1986) (uncharged-conduct evidence admissible to show relationship/opportunity under Rule 404(b))
- State v. Hanscom, 152 A.3d 632 (Me. 2016) (specific-unanimity instruction required when identical crimes may be aggregated and jury must agree on a particular occasion)
- State v. Shulikov, 712 A.2d 504 (Me. 1998) (repetitive-pattern testimony can support multiple-count convictions without discrete incident detail)
- State v. Fortune, 34 A.3d 1115 (Me. 2011) (discusses aggregation of identical crimes in a single count and unanimity concerns)
- People v. Jones, 792 P.2d 643 (Cal. 1990) (victim need not specify exact dates; must describe acts, general time period, and frequency to support multiple counts)
- Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (U.S. 2003) (retroactive extension of limitations can raise ex post facto issues; distinguishes circumstances where prosecution was not previously barred)
