State of Maine v. James D. Graham, 113 A.3d 1102

Background

On May 22, 2013 James D. Graham approached a grandmother and her two-year-old grandson in a Park & Ride, grabbed the child’s forearm, said “I’m taking him home with me tonight,” and pulled; the grandmother retained the child and Graham released him when a car started.
Graham later followed the women on the highway; troopers stopped and arrested him and found weapons and restraint materials in his SUV.
Graham was charged with attempted kidnapping and assault; he waived a jury and elected a bench trial. He did not assert the insanity affirmative defense but sought to raise a mental abnormality defense under 17-A M.R.S. § 38.
Two defense and State experts agreed Graham suffered distorted perceptions/psychiatric symptoms at the time, but both opined he could engage in goal-directed, planful behavior.
The trial court found Graham acted under an abnormal perception of reality but nevertheless engaged in volitional, goal-directed conduct (e.g., following the women, conversing, operating his vehicle) and concluded the State had proved intent to restrain the child beyond a reasonable doubt.
Graham was convicted of attempted kidnapping and assault and appealed, challenging the trial court’s handling of the mental abnormality defense and the sufficiency of the evidence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the trial court apply the correct legal standard in evaluating the § 38 mental abnormality defense?	State: Court applied § 38 correctly and kept burden on State to prove culpable state beyond a reasonable doubt.	Graham: Court misstated law by focusing on reasonableness and effectively shifting burden or misanalyzing the defense.	Affirmed: Court used correct analysis — considered whether abnormality raised reasonable doubt as to intent and did not shift burden.
Did evidence of mental abnormality negate the requisite intent for attempted kidnapping?	State: Evidence showed goal-directed conduct and statements demonstrating conscious object to take the child, so intent was proven beyond reasonable doubt.	Graham: His psychotic break undermined any finding of intent to knowingly restrain and move the child a substantial distance.	Affirmed: Court reasonably found intent present despite abnormal perception because actions were volitional and planful.
Was the evidence sufficient to support attempted kidnapping conviction?	State: Yes — viewing evidence in favor of the State, the taking, statements, following the victims, and expert testimony supported intent.	Graham: No — his abnormal mental state created reasonable doubt about intent and moving the child a substantial distance.	Affirmed: Sufficiency satisfied; fact-finder could rationally find intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
Did the court inappropriately require proof of reasonableness or a justification defense?	State: Court appropriately considered reasonableness only as relevant to whether perception was distorted and whether conduct was volitional.	Graham: Court conflated reasonableness with justification and burden-shifting.	Affirmed: Court’s references to reasonableness were properly limited and not a substitution for guilt elements or a justification analysis.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Cannell, 916 A.2d 231 (Me. 2007) (standard of review for statutory defense application)
State v. Likay, 458 A.2d 427 (Me. 1983) (when mental abnormality is raised, prosecution must still prove culpable state beyond reasonable doubt)
State v. Estes, 418 A.2d 1108 (Me. 1980) (distinction between mental abnormality and insanity defenses)
State v. Mishne, 427 A.2d 450 (Me. 1981) (evidence of mental difficulties does not necessarily negate intentional conduct)
State v. Abbott, 622 A.2d 723 (Me. 1993) (assessing relationship between abnormal mental state and purposeful conduct)
State v. Gallant, 847 A.2d 413 (Me. 2004) (sufficiency review standard when mental abnormality evidence introduced)
State v. Huff, 469 A.2d 1251 (Me. 1984) (evidence supporting intent to complete an offense)