238 A.3d 241
Me.2020Background:
- Undercover MDEA agent made two purchases of cocaine base from “G-Town” (Michael Nelson) in a Gardiner apartment; a July 31, 2018 search produced two arrests (Nelson and Jahneiro Plummer).
- Agents found loose powder on a paper plate, scales, sandwich bags, a sock containing heroin and cocaine base, $14,035 cash, and a bag holding Plummer’s ID, wallet, two digital scales, a cellphone, and rubber bands; total seized: ~150 g heroin and ~230 g cocaine base.
- Plummer (from Brooklyn, NY) testified he traveled to Maine to record music and smoke marijuana, denied knowledge of drug sales, and said he fled on instinct when agents announced themselves.
- At trial the court sustained a 403 objection to testimony characterizing the New York–Maine route as a typical drug route but allowed general testimony that drugs are typically imported to Maine; jury received accomplice-liability instructions and was denied a jury request to view an MDEA agent’s written report (the transcript of the agent’s testimony was provided).
- Jury convicted Plummer of two counts of aggravated trafficking (Class A) and criminal forfeiture; trial court denied a new-trial motion attacking closing argument, and Plummer appealed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Accomplice-liability jury instruction (ambiguity over which crime) | Instruction implied accomplice liability could attach for any crime, not limited to aggravated or unlawful trafficking | Instructions read as a whole tied accomplice liability to the specific charged offenses | No obvious error; instructions, read in context, properly limited liability to the charged offenses |
| Accomplice-liability: convicting for aggravated trafficking based on intent to promote merely unlawful trafficking | Jury could convict Plummer of aggravated trafficking as an accomplice even if his intent only related to lesser unlawful trafficking | The use of “or” and earlier language made clear accomplice liability applied to the same crime the principal committed; jury could convict of aggravated vs unlawful trafficking appropriately | No error; instruction structure did not mislead jury into convicting for a greater crime based on intent to promote a lesser one |
| Accomplice-liability: omission of "reasonably foreseeable consequence" instruction | Court should have instructed on 17-A M.R.S. § 57(3)(A)’s foreseeable-consequence basis for accomplice liability | Foreseeable-consequence instruction is warranted only when a secondary, distinct crime was committed; here aggravated and unlawful trafficking differ only by quantity, not separate crimes | No error; foreseeability instruction not required and would have expanded, not narrowed, accomplice liability |
| Jury instruction re: MDEA agent’s written report (denying report and telling jury not to speculate) | Instruction improperly constrained jury from inferring lack of evidence and thus undermined reasonable-doubt evaluation | Court properly denied submission of unadmitted material and appropriately instructed jurors not to speculate about its contents | No obvious error; instruction was proper and did not undercut burden of proof |
| Motion for new trial: prosecutor’s closing argument referencing Plummer’s out-of-state residence | Closing comments impermissibly invoked Plummer’s New York residence to prejudice jury | Comments focused on implausibility of Plummer’s stated purpose for travel and timing, not on out‑of‑state status per se | No abuse of discretion; no obvious error affecting substantial rights; remarks targeted credibility, not prejudice based on residence |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Coleman, 221 A.3d 932 (Me. 2019) (reviews unpreserved jury-instruction errors for obvious error)
- State v. Pabon, 28 A.3d 1147 (Me. 2011) (defines obvious-error standard for unpreserved errors)
- State v. Hansley, 203 A.3d 827 (Me. 2019) (jury-instruction review requires reading instructions in their entirety)
- State v. Berry, 711 A.2d 142 (Me. 1998) (foreseeable-consequence instruction warranted only when a distinct secondary crime is charged)
- State v. Goodall, 407 A.2d 268 (Me. 1979) (rejects view that foreseeable-consequence language limits accomplice liability)
- State v. Armstrong, 503 A.2d 701 (Me. 1986) (discusses accomplice-liability principles)
- State v. Daluz, 143 A.3d 800 (Me. 2016) (standard of review for preserved vs unpreserved objections in closing argument challenges)
- State v. Gantnier, 55 A.3d 404 (Me. 2012) (defines lesser-included-offense concept)