State of Maine v. Jacob R. Labbe Sr., 314 A.3d 162

Jacob R. Labbe Sr. was convicted in Maine on one count of domestic violence stalking and two counts of violating a protective order following persistent, unwanted phone and text contact with his former partner after being told to stop and despite a restraining order.
The protected person was his prior spouse (or partner) and mother of his child; their relationship had a history of domestic abuse and previous violations of court orders by Labbe.
After Labbe returned to the area after a period of incarceration, contact regarding their shared child escalated beyond legitimate concerns and continued through covert means, causing emotional distress and requiring the victim to take protective measures.
Labbe was served with a temporary protection order which he acknowledged but proceeded to violate repeatedly via various phone numbers and indirect contact.
At trial, Labbe was convicted, and he appealed on several grounds including the constitutionality and sufficiency of the stalking statute, various evidentiary rulings, the applicability of the U.S. Supreme Court's Counterman v. Colorado decision, and denial of a de minimis infraction dismissal.
After submission of supplemental briefing and amicus input regarding the applicability of Counterman to Maine's stalking statute, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Vagueness of Stalking Statute	Law is unconstitutionally vague and doesn’t give fair notice for proscribed conduct.	Statute is clear; conduct fell within the statute’s scope.	Statute is not vague as applied; conviction stands.
Sufficiency of Evidence	Evidence was insufficient: his messages weren’t threatening and didn’t amount to stalking.	Evidence established repeated, unwelcome contact causing distress.	Evidence was sufficient for conviction.
De Minimis Infraction	Even if technical violation, conduct was too trivial or tolerated to warrant conviction.	Conduct was the type the statute intended to proscribe, causing real harm.	No abuse of discretion in denying de minimis dismissal.
Evidentiary Rulings (prior bad acts, prior orders)	Admission of prior violation and references was unfairly prejudicial and inadmissible under evidence rules.	Evidence was relevant to victim’s state of mind; court gave limiting instruction.	No clear error or abuse of discretion in admission; instructions cured any prejudice.
Constitutional Mens Rea (Counterman v. Colorado)	Post-Counterman, statute must require subjective awareness (recklessness) as to the effect of communications to comply with First Amendment.	The case was not about the message content but about persistent, unwanted contact; Counterman doesn't apply here.	Counterman not violated; focus was on the conduct, not content; subjective recklessness not required in this context.

Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (U.S. 1987) (retroactivity of new criminal procedure rules to pending direct appeals)
Rowan v. U.S. Post Off. Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (U.S. 1970) (no constitutional right to force unwanted speech upon another)
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (U.S. 1949) (First Amendment does not immunize illegal course of conduct merely because it involves speech)
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (U.S. 2003) (defining what constitutes a "true threat" for First Amendment purposes)
State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81 (Me. 1996) (sets standard for de minimis infraction dismissal in Maine)