State of Maine v. Duane Marquis, 290 A.3d 96

Duane Marquis, owner/operator of a private driving school, taught a driver’s education course at a public high school but was not employed or paid by the school; students paid his business directly.
The school provided classroom space, equipment, sign-up access, and allowed students to earn elective credit toward graduation if they obtained learner’s permits based on Marquis’s completion cards and grading of a written test.
While in school-sponsored classroom sessions and supervised driving, students were subject to the school’s code of conduct; the principal could cancel Marquis’s classes and exclude him from campus.
Marquis picked up an 18-year-old student from school, drove her to a motel, and engaged in sexual acts; he had also told her he could influence her course outcome and asked secrecy.
The State charged Marquis with two counts of gross sexual assault under 17-A M.R.S. § 253(2)(F), which prohibits sexual acts with a student when the actor is a teacher, employee, or “other official” having instructional, supervisory, or disciplinary authority.
At a jury-waived trial the sole contested issue was whether Marquis qualified as an “other official”; the trial court found the school had clothed him with authority and convicted him. On appeal the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the term “other official” in § 253(2)(F) is ambiguous and how it should be interpreted	The State: plain meaning covers persons whom the school has empowered to exercise authority over students, even if not employees	Marquis: phrase should be read narrowly; he was not a school employee and lacked formal appointment or compensation	Court: "other official" is unambiguous; limited by ejusdem generis to persons the school has empowered with instructional, supervisory, or disciplinary authority akin to teachers/employees
Whether evidence was sufficient to prove Marquis was an “other official”	The State: school conferred visible authority—classroom use, credit linkage, discipline via principal, sign‑out privileges, principal’s recognition—that students would view him as vested with authority	Marquis: lack of formal contract, pay, title, or routine performance reviews shows he was not an official of the school	Court: evidence was sufficient; reasonable for fact‑finder to conclude the school cloaked Marquis with authority and that students would view him as having supervisory/instructional power

State v. Wilson, 127 A.3d 1234 (Me. 2015) (standards for reviewing sufficiency of evidence)
State v. Conroy, 225 A.3d 1011 (Me. 2020) (statutory interpretation principles)
State v. Greenleaf, 863 A.2d 877 (Me. 2004) (deference to fact‑finder and evidentiary sufficiency)
State v. Ferris, 284 A.2d 288 (Me. 1971) (application of ejusdem generis)
State v. Legassie, 171 A.3d 589 (Me. 2017) (ambiguity and rule of lenity in criminal statutes)
State v. Cummings, 166 A.3d 996 (Me. 2017) (deference to credibility determinations and reasonable inferences)