60 A.3d 1254
Me.2013Background
- Butsitsi was tried for the intentional or knowing murder of his roommate in Portland, Maine, and the jury found him guilty; he admitted shooting but claimed self-defense.
- The State sought to cross-examine him about who provided the gun, arguing it related to his state of mind and self-defense theory.
- Butsitsi initially refused to answer, invoking the Fifth Amendment, and the court found a waiver due to his direct testimony about obtaining the gun.
- The court instructed the jury that it could consider his refusal to answer but did not reveal the privilege invocation to the jurors.
- The court sua sponte determined the waiver existed and allowed the cross-examination question, later giving a Caminetti-style instruction that the jury could consider his refusal.
- The conviction was affirmed on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Butsitsi validly waived the Fifth Amendment privilege | Butsitsi waived by testifying about gun procurement | Waiver flawed; testimony alone not a valid waiver | Waiver valid; cross-exam permissible under scope of direct testimony |
| Whether the State’s cross-examination question about the gun’s provider was within the scope of cross-examination | Question relevant to self-defense and state of mind | Question collateral, not probative of guilt | Within scope; probative to self-defense theory remains within scope |
| Whether the jury should be informed that Butsitsi invoked the Fifth Amendment | Not applicable; the privilege was invoked | Instruction could prejudice defense | Court properly instructed about permissible consideration of the unprivileged refusal under Caminetti-like standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951) (establishes Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in trials)
- Linscott, 521 A.2d 701 (Me. 1987) (state privilege interpretations and appellate review by abuse of discretion)
- Collett v. Bither, 262 A.2d 353 (Me. 1970) (deference to trial court on fear of self-incrimination)
- Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958) (extent of waiver from volunteering testimony)
- Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304 (1900) (waiver extends to cross-examination within scope of testimony)
- Robbins, 318 A.2d 51 (Me. 1974) (court determines whether privilege claim is properly invoked)
- Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (allows inference from defendant’s failure to deny or explain incriminating acts after testifying)
- Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (no inference may be drawn from failure to testify; instruction to jury must consider waiver context)
- State v. Day, 538 A.2d 1166 (Me. 1988) (review of cross-examination scope for abuse of discretion)
- Tremblay, 2003 ME 47, 820 A.2d 571 (Me. 2003) (Me. standard on cross-examination and privilege)