State of Maine v. Daniel P. Warner, 301 A.3d 763

Defendant Daniel P. Warner was tried for sexual offenses after a 13‑year‑old niece testified that Warner touched her breasts and genitals and used his genitals to touch her face; Warner was indicted on four counts and tried by jury.
One juror was released after close contact with a COVID‑positive person; the court informed remaining jurors and allowed an anonymous vote whether to continue or postpone; jurors unanimously chose to continue; Warner did not object.
At closing, the prosecutor urged jurors to consider whether the victim had a motive to lie; defense argued motive was irrelevant and that it was not the jury’s job to determine motive; Warner did not object to the prosecutor’s remarks.
The court instructed the jury on credibility, including that they may consider evidence of a witness’s motive or lack of motive to lie, and repeatedly instructed on the State’s burden and the defendant’s lack of burden to present evidence; Warner did not object to the instruction.
The jury convicted Warner on one count of unlawful sexual contact and acquitted him on the other three counts; Warner was sentenced and timely appealed.
On appeal Warner raised three principal claims: (1) improper prosecutorial remarks about motive in closing; (2) erroneous jury instruction on motive; and (3) juror coercion risk from the COVID‑exposure procedure. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Warner)	Held
Prosecutor’s closing remarks about victim’s motive	Remarks responded to defense theory and focused on the evidence and credibility — permissible rebuttal.	Remarks implied a burden shift and suggested Warner had to produce evidence disproving motive to lie.	No obvious error; comments were evidence‑focused and responsive to defense.
Trial court’s credibility instruction mentioning motive	Instruction was a standard credibility factor and properly framed as one of many tests jurors may consider.	Instruction reified prosecutor’s alleged burden‑flip and risked suggesting absence of motive evidence favored conviction.	No obvious error; instruction allowed consideration of motive or lack thereof and was framed permissively within correct burden instructions.
Jury coercion from COVID exposure process	Court gave jurors a genuine choice, an anonymous vote, and later non‑coercive deliberation instructions.	Court’s comments (e.g., “nobody wants a mistrial”) and framing pressured jurors to continue and may have induced hasty or coerced verdict.	No obvious error; unanimous anonymous vote to continue, neutral later instructions, and acquittals on three counts indicate lack of coercion.

State v. Wai Chan, 236 A.3d 471 (Me. 2020) (standards for obvious‑error review and limits on prosecutorial burden‑shift comments)
State v. Dolloff, 58 A.3d 1032 (Me. 2012) (evaluating prosecutor comments in context and cumulative‑error analysis)
State v. Rosario, 280 A.3d 199 (Me. 2022) (review of jury instructions under obvious‑error standard)
State v. DeLong, 505 A.2d 803 (Me. 1986) (analysis of impermissible jury coercion and context of judge’s remarks)
State v. Ashley, 666 A.2d 103 (Me. 1995) (representative instruction deviation not reversible where legal standards are correctly conveyed)
State v. Athayde, 277 A.3d 387 (Me. 2022) (viewing evidence in light most favorable to the State for sufficiency review)
State v. Sousa, 222 A.3d 171 (Me. 2019) (addressing prosecutor argument about motive and credibility)
State v. Hunt, 293 A.3d 423 (Me. 2023) (no error where prosecutor’s motive argument remained focused on evidence)
State v. Cummings, 295 A.3d 1227 (Me. 2023) (similar holding that motive comments can be acceptable when tied to credibility evidence)
State v. Dorweiler, 143 A.3d 114 (Me. 2016) (standard for sufficiency of evidence review)