225 A.3d 1011
Me.2020Background
- In May 2017 Colby Conroy, a 22-year-old rostered substitute teacher for RSU 39, met a 15‑year‑old student while substituting in her culinary arts class on May 22.
- After class Conroy friended the student on Facebook, communicated with her, met her the next day, exchanged sexual text messages and nude photos, and on May 24 drove her to a secluded area where he performed a sexual act and sexual touching.
- Conroy was indicted on multiple counts; at a jury‑waived trial the State dismissed some counts and the court convicted Conroy of four remaining charges: gross sexual assault, unlawful sexual contact, sexual abuse of a minor, and unlawful sexual touching.
- Conroy appealed, challenging (1) the trial court’s rejection of his statutory defense that he reasonably believed the student was at least 16, (2) whether he qualified as an employee/teacher for unlawful sexual touching, and (3) whether he “had instructional, supervisory or disciplinary authority” over the student at the time of the sexual act/contact for the gross sexual assault and unlawful sexual contact statutes.
- The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed convictions for sexual abuse of a minor and unlawful sexual touching, but vacated convictions for gross sexual assault and unlawful sexual contact because the State failed to prove contemporaneous authority; remanded for resentencing as appropriate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State disproved Conroy’s statutory defense that he reasonably believed the student was ≥16 (17‑A M.R.S. § 254(2)) | State: evidence disproved the defense beyond a reasonable doubt; Conroy’s claimed belief was unreasonable | Conroy: trial court misallocated burden; he met the statutory defense | Held: Affirmed. Court found State met its burden to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt; belief found grossly unreasonable. |
| Whether Conroy was a “teacher, employee or other school official” for unlawful sexual touching (17‑A M.R.S. § 260(1)(J)) | State: Conroy’s rostered substitute status and relationship with RSU 39 made him an employee for purposes of the statute | Conroy: statute requires proof of status/authority at time of conduct; he argued he lacked status/authority then | Held: Affirmed. Court found competent evidence that Conroy remained a rostered substitute/employee on May 24 and sustained the unlawful sexual touching conviction. |
| Whether the State proved Conroy “having instructional, supervisory or disciplinary authority” over the student at the time of the sexual act/contact (17‑A M.R.S. §§ 253(2)(F), 255‑A(1)(K)) | State/trial court: prior teacher‑student relationship and grooming provided the requisite nexus even if authority was not exercised at the moment of the act | Conroy: the statutes require the actor to have such authority at the time of the sexual act/contact; prior authority alone is insufficient | Held: Vacated convictions for gross sexual assault and unlawful sexual contact. Court held the present‑tense term “having” requires contemporaneous authority at the time of the act; the State failed to prove that here. |
| Remedy: effect on sentencing and next steps | State: sentencing may be interrelated; court should determine effect | Conroy: (implicit) seek relief because two convictions vacated | Held: Remanded for the trial court to determine whether vacatur affects the remaining sentences and, if so, to conduct a new sentencing hearing for the affirmed convictions. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Haskell, 955 A.2d 737 (Me. 2008) (use of stipulated facts and reliance on trial record for appellate review)
- State v. Diecidue, 931 A.2d 1077 (Me. 2007) (standard of review for factual findings: clear error)
- State v. Lacourse, 159 A.3d 847 (Me. 2017) (State bears burden to disprove affirmative/statutory defense when evidence raises reasonable doubt)
- State v. Herzog, 44 A.3d 307 (Me. 2012) (review of trial court’s handling of statutory defenses and burdens)
- State v. Hastey, 196 A.3d 432 (Me. 2018) (statutory interpretation principles; avoid absurd results)
- State v. Legassie, 171 A.3d 589 (Me. 2017) (look to legislative history only if statute is ambiguous)
- Cape Elizabeth Sch. Bd. v. Cape Elizabeth Teachers Ass’n, 459 A.2d 166 (Me. 1983) (court will not rewrite plain statutory language)