State of Maine v. Clarence Cote
118 A.3d 805
| Me. | 2015Background
- Clarence Cote was indicted in 2012 for two 1990 counts of gross sexual assault against his niece; arrests and prosecution were delayed for years while Cote was out of state.
- A recorded police interview of the victim from December 1994 (conducted at her middle school) was later missing; contemporaneous detective notes existed.
- After Cote’s 2012 arrest, the State could not locate the 1994 recording; the tape had been transferred among agencies and its whereabouts were unknown.
- Cote moved to dismiss the indictment (and later renewed at trial), arguing the missing recording violated due process and that the 22-year pre-indictment delay prejudiced his defense.
- Trial court denied dismissal/suppression; at a two‑day jury trial in 2014 Cote was convicted on both counts and appealed.
- The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, addressing both the lost-evidence due process standard and the pre‑indictment delay claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Cote) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lost police interview recording | The missing 1994 tape was exculpatory (inconsistent victim statements) and its loss deprived Cote of a fair trial | Tape was not apparently exculpatory when lost; comparable evidence (detective report, witnesses) existed; no bad faith | Court affirmed denial: clarified analysis; tape was not apparently exculpatory and court did not err in finding no bad faith |
| Pre‑indictment delay (22 years) | Delay prejudiced Cote because the missing tape prevented full defense and impeachment of the victim | No actual and unjustifiable prejudice: inconsistencies were shown via report and testimony; heavy burden not met | Court affirmed denial: Cote failed to show actual, unjustified prejudice or causal link to earlier indictment |
| Applicable constitutional standard for lost evidence | (implicit) Maine courts should require showing of bad faith for any lost evidence | Follow U.S. Supreme Court: differentiate apparently exculpatory vs. potentially useful evidence | Court clarified law: bifurcated test—if evidence was apparently exculpatory, no bad faith needed; if only potentially useful, defendant must prove bad faith |
| Remedy for missing evidence | Dismissal/suppression warranted | No suppression/dismissal where no due process violation; other sanctions possible but not urged | No relief granted; suppression/dismissal not required where standards unmet |
Key Cases Cited
- California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (constitutional duty to preserve material exculpatory evidence)
- Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (no due process violation for loss of potentially useful evidence absent bad faith)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (prosecution must disclose material exculpatory evidence)
- United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (pre‑indictment delay framework and prejudice requirement)
- State v. Marroquin‑Aldana, 89 A.3d 519 (Me. 2014) (procedural standard for viewing facts in favor of the State on appeal)
