State of Maine v. Carter McBreairty
137 A.3d 1012
| Me. | 2016Background
- In April 2014 the State filed a 17-count complaint against Carter McBreairty arising from an undercover game warden’s year‑and‑a‑half investigation of hunting/fishing activity; McBreairty pleaded guilty to one count and proceeded to jury trial on the rest.
- The jury acquitted McBreairty on three counts and convicted him on thirteen counts (hunting/fishing violations, hunting under the influence, loaded firearms in vehicles, theft of services, criminal trespass, etc.).
- On the first day of trial McBreairty submitted an accord and satisfaction signed by the executive director of North Maine Woods purporting to release him from two theft‑of‑services counts; the court deferred ruling and later declined to dismiss those counts after the director recanted, saying he had been misled.
- The State introduced photographs of fish as evidence but did not produce the actual fish during discovery; McBreairty later complained he could not inspect the fish and did not move for a new trial.
- During closing the prosecutor misstated that a witness had been convicted for "lying . . . trying to protect a friend," adding a factual detail not in evidence; the court declined McBreairty’s request for a curative instruction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for specified counts (theft of services, loaded firearm in vehicle, hunting under the influence) | Evidence was insufficient to sustain convictions on Counts 10, 12, 14, 16, 17 | Jury verdicts should be set aside because evidence did not establish elements beyond a reasonable doubt | Affirmed: viewing evidence in light most favorable to verdict, jury could rationally find elements beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Validity/enforceability of accord and satisfaction releasing theft counts | The written accord signed by injured party required dismissal of Counts 10 and 12 | State challenged validity; signatory later said he was misled and would not have signed | No abuse of discretion in declining to dismiss; trial court appropriately deferred and considered conflicting evidence |
| Discovery breach for failing to produce actual fish | Failure to produce fish prejudiced defense because witness testified from poor photographs and defendant was denied meaningful inspection | State had produced photos and, per the warden’s report, retained the fish; defendant did not seek production or a new trial | Not preserved; no adequate record of prejudice; no obvious error found |
| Prosecutorial misstatement in closing (fact not in evidence re: witness lying to protect a friend) | Misstatement was misconduct that warranted a curative instruction or reversal | Misstatement was not material to elements, bore on credibility already impeached, and was harmless in context | Harmless error: no prejudice sufficient to affect outcome; no reversal required |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Jones, 46 A.3d 1125 (Me. 2012) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- State v. Milliken, 985 A.2d 1152 (Me. 2010) (reviewing evidence and inferences in light most favorable to verdict)
- State v. Medeiros, 997 A.2d 95 (Me. 2010) (fact‑finder entitled to draw reasonable inferences and assess credibility)
- State v. Young, 476 A.2d 186 (Me. 1984) (court may dismiss prosecutions when injured party acknowledges satisfaction)
- State v. Young, 777 A.2d 830 (Me. 2001) (abuse‑of‑discretion review where court rejects proffered accord and satisfaction)
- State v. Reese, 991 A.2d 806 (Me. 2010) (defendant must show prejudice from discovery violation to obtain reversal)
- State v. Pabon, 28 A.3d 1147 (Me. 2011) (plain‑error/obvious error standard requires error that is plain and affects substantial rights)
- State v. Dolloff, 58 A.3d 1032 (Me. 2012) (framework for assessing prosecutorial misconduct and harmless error)
- United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1985) (discussing line between acceptable and improper advocacy)
- State v. Pendexter, 495 A.2d 1241 (Me. 1985) (central question is whether prosecutor’s comment is fairly based on facts in evidence)
