259 A.3d 127
Me.2021Background:
- On June 9–11, 2016 officers investigated a missing-person report concerning Akers’s neighbor; officers contacted Akers previously and he declined an offer to meet.
- At midnight on June 11 three officers walked a footpath onto Akers’s posted property, approached a padlocked camper, heard a loud thud, lifted a window cover and saw Akers inside a sleeping bag.
- Officers identified themselves, pried off the exterior padlock, had Akers come outside, recorded an on-scene exchange in which Akers made inculpatory remarks, and then transported him to a substation; he was Mirandized later and requested counsel.
- A detective’s affidavit—relying in part on Akers’s statements—supported a search warrant; the subsequent search uncovered the victim’s body and a bloody machete.
- Akers moved to suppress the physical evidence and his statements as products of unlawful searches and coercive questioning; the trial court denied suppression, a jury convicted Akers of murder, and he appealed.
- The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the conviction, holding the curtilage entry and lifting the window cover were unreasonable searches, Akers’s pre‑Miranda statements were involuntary, and suppression was warranted; remanded for further proceedings.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Akers) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers’ midnight entry onto Akers’s curtilage was a lawful search | Entry was a reasonable extension of the missing‑person investigation | Entry was an unreasonable, warrantless intrusion onto posted private property | Entry onto curtilage was an unreasonable, warrantless search and not justified by consent/knock‑and‑talk or exigency |
| Whether lifting the camper’s window cover and peering inside was justified by the emergency‑aid doctrine | The thud plus context gave objectively reasonable basis to check for an injured person | A single thud did not create objectively reasonable belief of an emergency | Lifting the window cover was not justified by the emergency‑aid exception and was an unreasonable search |
| Whether statements and later evidence should be suppressed as fruits of the unlawful searches | Suppression not required; investigatory steps were reasonable and any taint was attenuated | Statements and evidence flowed directly from the illegal searches and should be excluded | Suppression required: close temporal proximity, no intervening circumstances, and police conduct was purposeful/flagrant enough that deterrence outweighs costs |
| Whether Akers’s inculpatory statements were voluntary under federal and Maine constitutions | Statements were voluntary; Miranda warnings were given later and later interview was invoked | Statements were involuntary due to nocturnal rousing, presence of three uniformed officers, and pointed questioning before Miranda | Statements were not shown beyond a reasonable doubt to be voluntary under Maine’s higher voluntariness standard and must be suppressed |
Key Cases Cited
- Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (search doctrine—privacy expectations and warrant requirement for home‑intrusive techniques)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (reasonable expectation of privacy test)
- Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (physical intrusion onto curtilage is a search)
- Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018) (curtilage protections extend to vehicles parked there)
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (warrant requirement absent recognized exception)
- Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 390 (2006) (emergency‑aid exception permits warrantless entry to render aid when objectively reasonable)
- Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009) (objective‑reasonableness standard for emergency‑aid doctrine)
- Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (exclusionary‑rule attenuation analysis: temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, purpose/flagrancy of misconduct)
- Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (limits on searching third‑party homes without a warrant)
- Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) (exclusionary rule focused on deterrence and weighing societal costs)