State of Maine v. Anthony Lord, 208 A.3d 781

In July 2015 Anthony Lord went on a multi-hour violent rampage across Aroostook and Penobscot Counties, killing two people and seriously injuring others; conduct included arson, multiple shootings, thefts, and firing at police.
Lord pleaded guilty to two counts of murder and twelve other offenses; three charges were dismissed as part of the plea agreement.
At sentencing the court followed the two-step Maine murder-sentencing process: it set the basic sentence and then determined the maximum by weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.
In step one the court found aggravating circumstances (multiple deaths and that the murders were part of a violent crime spree, including possession of firearms by a felon) and set basic sentences of life imprisonment for each murder.
In step two the court considered victim impact, Lord’s criminal history, and mitigating factors (PTSD after his infant son’s death, remorse, family support) and concluded aggravators outweighed mitigators, imposing concurrent life sentences and concurrent terms for other convictions.
Lord appealed to the Sentence Review Panel arguing (1) the court improperly considered his other contemporaneous crimes in setting the basic life sentences and (2) the court double-counted his criminal history; the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Lord)	Held
Whether the sentencing court improperly considered Lord’s other contemporaneous crimes in setting the basic sentence (step one)	The State: the surrounding violent conduct showed aggravating circumstances justifying life sentences	Lord: the court relied improperly on other crimes (not the murder itself) to justify life sentences	Court: affirmed — considering the contemporaneous rampage and felon-in-possession conduct in step one was proper to assess the nature/seriousness of the murders
Whether the court impermissibly "double-counted" Lord’s criminal history by using it in both step one and as an aggravating factor in step two	The State: the court considered probation-violation possession in step one as part of the nature/seriousness of the crimes and separately considered criminal history in step two	Lord: the court double-counted the same criminal-history facts across both steps	Court: affirmed — the court used the probation/possession issue in step one in an objective way distinct from treating overall criminal history as a subjective aggravator in step two; no error

State v. Hayden, 86 A.3d 1221 (Me. 2014) (two-step murder-sentencing framework; review standards)
State v. Sweet, 745 A.2d 368 (Me. 2000) (step-one must identify lawful sentencing range and consider factors that affect class)
State v. Shortsleeves, 580 A.2d 145 (Me. 1990) (list of aggravating circumstances guiding life-sentence decisions)
State v. Waterman, 995 A.2d 243 (Me. 2010) (permitting consideration of circumstances beyond Shortsleeves list; treatment of felon-in-possession conduct)
State v. Downs, 962 A.2d 950 (Me. 2009) (upholding consideration of contemporaneous criminal conduct in step one when it bears on the nature/seriousness of the offense)