State of Maine v. Anthony W. Pratt Jr.
130 A.3d 381
| Me. | 2015Background
- Victim Margarita Scott was in a relationship with Anthony Pratt Jr.; tensions arose because she maintained contact with her husband and wore his ring as well as Pratt’s.
- On November 10, 2012, Pratt violently assaulted Scott at her Westbrook apartment; neighbors and others observed injuries and Scott reported pain and ringing in her ears.
- Scott disappeared early on November 11; her body was later found in her truck with a fatal gunshot wound to the neck; forensic evidence linked Pratt to the gun at some point.
- Pratt was interviewed twice by Detective Richard Vogel (one recorded interview in New York). Vogel repeatedly told Pratt he thought Pratt was lying; the second interview was played for the jury at trial.
- Pratt was indicted for murder, moved in limine to exclude the recorded interview and evidence of the prior assault; the trial court admitted both with limiting instructions. Pratt was convicted and appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Pratt) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of recorded interrogation (hearsay / Rule 403) | Recording is probative of defendant’s statements and demeanor; officer’s words provide context. | Vogel’s statements on recording are hearsay and should be excluded; prejudicial under Rule 403. | Admission proper: officer’s remarks were not offered for truth but for context; probative value outweighed prejudice. |
| Prosecutorial vouching via recorded interview | Playing the recording is not the prosecutor’s opinion and does not constitute vouching. | Vogel’s statements that Pratt was lying (and Vogel’s prominence at trial) equate to improper prosecutorial vouching. | No vouching: officer’s recorded belief differs from prosecutor’s opinion; jurors can distinguish roles. |
| Adequacy of limiting instruction for recorded statements | Limiting instruction allowed jury to consider officer statements only for context, not truth. | The instruction was insufficient to cure prejudice from Vogel’s statements. | No obvious error: defendant agreed to the instruction; instruction correctly stated law and jury presumed to follow it. |
| Admissibility of prior assault under Rules 404(b) and 403; due process claim | Prior assault evidence is admissible for motive, intent, identity, absence of mistake, and relationship; probative value high and limiting instruction mitigates prejudice. | Evidence was unfairly prejudicial, low probative value; limiting instruction on 404(b) insufficient; cumulative constitutional due process violation. | No error: evidence relevant to core issue (identity/motive); probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice; limiting instructions adequate; no due process violation. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Mannion, 637 A.2d 452 (Me. 1994) (officer statements during interrogation admissible for context, not for truth)
- Reardon v. Larkin, 3 A.3d 376 (Me. 2010) (standard for viewing facts in light most favorable to jury verdict)
- State v. Schmidt, 957 A.2d 80 (Me. 2008) (prosecutor may not express opinion on defendant credibility)
- State v. Wyman, 107 A.3d 641 (Me. 2015) (presumption that jury follows limiting instructions)
- State v. Barnes, 845 A.2d 575 (Me. 2004) (Rule 404(b) permits prior-act evidence for motive, intent, identity, absence of mistake, or relationship)
