State of Maine v. Andrew M. Sousa, 222 A.3d 171

April 9, 2018: Sousa entered a Unity pharmacy masked, presented a note demanding oxycodone; clerk (who recognized him) and pharmacist handed over a bag containing well over 1,000 pills; surveillance video recorded the incident. Nine days later officers arrested Sousa with nearly 800 pills.
Sousa was charged with robbery (Class B) and unlawful possession of scheduled drugs (Class D); he pled not guilty; at trial the parties stipulated Sousa was the actor; contested issue was whether he intentionally or knowingly placed the clerk in fear of imminent force.
Sousa presented a neuropsychologist who diagnosed a schizophrenia-spectrum disorder and testified Sousa was in severe pain and desperate; the expert said Sousa’s delusional beliefs about sources of pain influenced him, impairing appreciation of the effect on others, but also testified Sousa knew he was going to a pharmacy and generally knew his conduct was wrong.
In rebuttal the prosecutor told the jury there was “no evidence” Sousa was delusional when he entered the pharmacy; Sousa objected, arguing this shifted the burden of proof; the court overruled, then instructed the jury that the burden of proof rested with the State and explained the legal significance of mental-condition evidence.
The jury convicted on both counts; Sousa appealed arguing (1) the prosecutor shifted the burden of proof and (2) the prosecutor misstated evidence in rebuttal. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether prosecutor’s remark that there was “no evidence” of delusion shifted the burden of proof	The remark analyzed evidence and did not shift the burden; the court’s instructions placed burden squarely on the State	The remark implied Sousa had to prove delusions, reversing the burden of proof	No misconduct; no burden shift; overruling of objection was correct and jury instructions cured any risk
Whether the prosecutor misstated the evidence by saying there was “no evidence” of delusions	The statement fairly characterized the expert’s central testimony that Sousa had no delusions about the pharmacy, persons present, or consequences	The expert did testify to some delusional beliefs about pain sources, so the prosecutor’s statement was inaccurate	Any mischaracterization was not material; no obvious error; court was not required to intervene sua sponte

State v. Pelletier, 212 A.3d 325 (Me. 2019) (standard for viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the State)
State v. Clark, 954 A.2d 1066 (Me. 2008) (approach to prosecutorial misconduct review)
State v. Cheney, 55 A.3d 473 (Me. 2012) (harmless-error review when misconduct is preserved)
State v. Dolloff, 58 A.3d 1032 (Me. 2012) (obvious-error standard and effect on outcome analysis)
State v. Griffin, 159 A.3d 1240 (Me. 2017) (legal significance of evidence of an abnormal mental condition)
State v. Murphy, 496 A.2d 623 (Me. 1985) (earlier precedent on mental-condition evidence)