State of Louisiana v. Woodrow Karey, Jr., A/K/A Woodrow Karey, II
2016-K-0377
| La. | Jun 29, 2017Background
- On Sept. 27, 2013 Woodrow Karey Jr. shot and killed Ronald Harris; Karey surrendered and said the victim raped his wife.
- Defense counsel provided prosecutors a list of four defense witnesses, summaries of their expected grand jury testimony, and agreed to waive spousal privilege for the defendant’s wife so she would testify before the grand jury.
- Parties agreed the matter would be fairly presented to the grand jury and the grand jury would decide the appropriate charge; defense says there was an implicit agreement the parties would abide by that decision.
- First grand jury returned a true bill for manslaughter and no true bill for second-degree murder; prosecution later presented the case to a different grand jury ~7½ months later and obtained a second-degree murder indictment.
- Karey moved to quash the second-degree murder indictment arguing the State breached the agreement and he detrimentally relied on it; the district court granted the motion, the court of appeal reversed, and the Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari and reinstated the district court order quashing the indictment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Karey) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Existence/enforceability of an agreement not to prosecute beyond the first grand jury | No binding bargain existed—prosecutors only promised to "fairly present" evidence; no written deal; prosecutors retained charging discretion | There was an implied agreement: in exchange for witness names, summaries, spousal-waiver and work product, State agreed to be bound by the first grand jury’s charge | Court sided with Karey: district court crediting defense testimony had a rational basis; agreement existed and was enforceable by specific performance |
| Whether State had justification to return to grand jury (withdrawal from agreement) | Subsequent investigation and newly discovered evidence justified presenting additional evidence to a second grand jury | No valid justification was proved; defendant detrimentally relied on the agreement and provided information not otherwise available to State | Court held State failed to justify withdrawal; specific performance (quash of second-degree murder indictment) appropriate |
| Timeliness / procedural defect in motion to quash | Motion allegedly filed under the earlier manslaughter case number and therefore untimely or improper | State failed to raise timeliness below; defendant’s motion was heard and litigated in district court | Court found no merit to State’s timeliness argument because it was not asserted in district court; appellate court correctly refused to consider it |
| Standard of review for credibility / factual findings | Appellate reversal argued because agreement claim unsupported; some justices urged closer scrutiny of loose, unwritten discussions | District court’s credibility findings should be afforded deference where record supports them | Court applied abuse-of-discretion review, deferred to district court credibility findings and upheld quash |
Key Cases Cited
- Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (prosecutor promises forming part of plea or cooperation inducement must be fulfilled)
- Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) (government obligations under agreements may give rise to remedies when not honored)
- State v. Tanner, 425 So.2d 760 (La. 1983) (agreements with prosecution enforceable when defendant relinquishes fundamental rights in reliance)
- State v. Louis, 645 So.2d 1144 (La. 1994) (enforcement of agreements not to prosecute when prosecution unjustifiably withdraws)
- State v. Caminita, 411 So.2d 13 (La. 1982) (government may withdraw from bargains absent detrimental reliance or bad-faith conduct)
- State v. Nall, 379 So.2d 731 (La. 1980) (agreement rescinded for failure of cause; statements given under belief agreement would be honored are involuntary)
- State v. Lewis, 539 So.2d 1199 (La. 1989) (withdrawal from plea/cooperation agreements permitted for failure of cause but statements made under belief of agreement may be suppressed)