239 So. 3d 807
La.2018Background
- In 1995 Rogers LaCaze and co-defendant Antoinette Frank were tried separately before Judge Frank Marullo for a triple murder; LaCaze was convicted and sentenced to death.
- Post-conviction proceedings revealed NOPD internal investigation into Officer David Talley’s release of two guns (one 9mm) to Frank; a release order bore a signature purporting to be Judge Marullo’s.
- Bureau investigators questioned Judge Marullo pre-allotment; he told investigators he did not recall signing the order and later said handwriting expert results suggested it was not his signature; he declined further comment once LaCaze’s case was assigned to him and did not disclose the investigation to the parties at trial.
- LaCaze alleged federal due-process violation: Judge Marullo’s involvement in the NOPD inquiry and nondisclosure created an unconstitutional probability of bias; trial court granted a new trial on unrelated juror-ground; the appellate court reinstated the conviction and rejected the recusal claim.
- The U.S. Supreme Court vacated this court’s decision and remanded to apply Rippo v. Baker’s clarified federal standard (objective probability of actual bias "too high to be constitutionally tolerable").
- On remand the Louisiana Supreme Court applied Rippo/Caperton/Withrow precedent, reviewed the record (including Marullo’s interviews and testimony), and denied LaCaze substantive relief, concluding the circumstances did not create an unconstitutional probability of bias.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (LaCaze) | Defendant's Argument (State/Marullo) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rippo’s objective standard requires recusal here | Marullo’s questioning in NOPD probe about an order releasing a potential murder weapon, plus nondisclosure, created an unconstitutional probability of bias | The investigation targeted Officer Talley, not Marullo; Marullo cooperated and properly limited comments once assigned; nondisclosure of the probe does not show probable bias | Rippo standard governs; remand required reanalysis, but facts here do not meet it |
| Whether the facts show an objective probability of actual bias "too high to be constitutionally tolerable" | The judge’s connection to the release order (possible forgery) and silence during trial gave rise to an intolerable risk of bias | No evidence Marullo had a personal stake, pecuniary interest, or adversarial relationship; the link to the merits was remote and neutral at best | No. The court found the risk too remote/attenuated to satisfy Rippo/Caperton threshold |
| Whether nondisclosure alone violates federal due process (Liljeberg argument) | Nondisclosure of facts an objective observer might find relevant requires recusal under due process | State: nondisclosure or canon violations alone don’t establish the constitutional probability-of-bias required by Rippo | Nondisclosure alone insufficient; must show objective probability of actual bias that is constitutionally intolerable |
| Remedy: whether LaCaze is entitled to a new trial or further relief | New trial and reversal based on biased tribunal due to Marullo’s involvement/nondisclosure | Reinstatement of conviction; no substantive relief warranted | Denied. Court reinstated conviction and denied writ for relief on federal due-process ground |
Key Cases Cited
- Rippo v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 905 (2017) (clarifies objective test: is the probability of actual bias too high to be constitutionally tolerable)
- Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (extreme facts can create constitutionally intolerable risk of bias; consider realistic psychological tendencies)
- Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (due process requires a tribunal with no bias or interest; quoted standard for probability of bias)
- Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016) (objective assessment of judicial disqualification under due process)
- Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988) (nondisclosure can implicate statutory recusal duties but does not automatically establish a constitutional violation)
- Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) (appearance of bias alone insufficient; due process concerns require more)
- Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (judge’s direct, substantial pecuniary interest in outcome violates due process)
- State v. LaCaze, 824 So.2d 1063 (La. 2002) (prior direct appeal affirming LaCaze’s conviction)