248 So. 3d 1279
La.2018Background
- Defendant Leroy Jackson was convicted by a jury of armed robbery and two counts of attempted armed robbery based solely on three eyewitness identifications from an August 15, 2009 robbery involving three assailants (two masked).
- A police composite depicting a dark-skinned man with short hair led to a detective proposing a photographic lineup; all three witnesses then identified Jackson in that lineup.
- Defense investigator obtained statements from two victims expressing uncertainty and describing the unmasked robber as lighter-skinned, short-haired, and of different height/weight/hairline than Jackson; counsel did not use these statements at trial and could not recall why.
- Trial evidence included a photographic lineup, composite sketch, and in-court identifications; there was no other physical or corroborating evidence linking Jackson to the crimes.
- On collateral review the district court granted a new trial for ineffective assistance of counsel; the court of appeal reinstated the convictions (divided panel); the Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- The Louisiana Supreme Court held that counsel’s failure to use the investigator’s statements was deficient and that prejudice under Strickland was shown because the case rested solely on identifications that were contradicted by those unused statements.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Jackson's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel’s failure to use investigator-obtained statements alleging inconsistent identifications was professionally unreasonable | Counsel might have acted strategically or investigator’s notes were unreliable; no proof of counsel deficiency | Counsel had the statements that undermined identifications yet did not use them; this omission was objectively unreasonable | Court: Counsel’s representation fell below objective standard — deficient performance |
| Whether Jackson was prejudiced under Strickland by counsel’s omission | Eyewitness identifications (composite, photographic lineup, in-court IDs) were presented to jury; result likely would not have changed | Case depended solely on eyewitness IDs; inconsistent/uncertain statements were material and would likely undermine confidence in outcome | Court: Prejudice shown — reasonable probability of different result; undermines confidence; new trial warranted |
| Whether cross-racial identification considerations and other indicia of unreliability should factor into the ineffectiveness analysis | Cross-racial concerns and identification weaknesses were considered by jury given composite and lineup evidence | Cross-racial ID and stark discrepancies between robber descriptions and Jackson’s appearance make IDs unreliable and counsel’s failure to exploit that was significant | Court: Those factors are relevant; identifications were highly suspect and supported finding of prejudice |
| Whether appellate courts correctly reinstated convictions on writ application | State argued trial record supported verdict and appellate reversal of district court was proper | Jackson argued district court rightly found ineffective assistance and ordered a new trial | Court: Reversed court of appeal; reinstated district court’s grant of new trial and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel: deficiency and prejudice)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (prejudice inquiry asks whether there is a reasonable likelihood the result would have been different; must be substantial)
- Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies in criminal prosecutions)
- McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (right to effective assistance of counsel recognized by the Court)
- United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (eyewitness identification evidence has a risk of mistaken identification)
- Jackson v. Fogg, 589 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1978) (convictions based solely on uncorroborated identifications are highly suspect)
- Gonzales v. Thaler, 643 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2011) (cross-racial identifications are particularly unreliable)