State of Louisiana v. Javan Marshall and Alfred Williams
342 So.3d 1029
La. Ct. App.2022Background
- On May 30, 2001 NOPD officers stopped a taxicab; a shootout occurred. Defendants Javan Marshall and Alfred Williams were indicted on multiple counts of attempted first-degree murder; they were convicted and sentenced; convictions affirmed on direct appeal (State v. Marshall).
- Post-conviction, defendants claimed (a) Brady violation for alleged nondisclosure of a 46‑page supplemental police report/search‑warrant return (vehicle evidence: 17 micro‑trace samples, 9 blood samples, 116 partial prints), and (b) ineffective assistance for failure to call witness Renard Price (later testifying at a 2018 evidentiary hearing that he observed police fire first).
- The trial court granted defendants’ Brady claim after a sua sponte in‑camera review of the grand jury transcripts and other materials, and dismissed some IAC claims as previously adjudicated; it denied other claims or dismissed them without prejudice.
- The State petitioned for supervisory review, arguing (inter alia) that the supposedly withheld report had been disclosed or was not material, and that the court erred by relying on a sealed grand jury review without letting the State respond.
- The appellate court held: the record does not support a Brady violation based on the supplemental report (defendants appeared to have had the relevant parts at trial), but the trial court granted Brady relief after a sua sponte grand jury review without giving the State an opportunity to respond about allegations that the State concealed or distorted Price’s testimony — that portion was vacated and remanded for briefing. The appellate court also vacated the dismissal of the IAC claim for failing to call Price and remanded; the attempted‑manslaughter challenge was denied as meritless.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brady nondisclosure of supplemental police report/search‑warrant evidence | Williams/Marshall: State withheld a 46‑page supplemental report listing 17 micro‑trace samples, 9 blood samples, and 116 partial fingerprints from the impounded cab; evidence was exculpatory/material | State: report (or portions) was disclosed or referenced at trial (search warrant referenced, exhibit S‑25 recovered from NOPD cage, Tafaro forensic report read into record); fingerprint evidence largely non‑identifiable and not material | Court: Record indicates defendants knew of vehicle search and related forensic testing; no Brady violation shown as to the supplemental report; defendants failed to show suppressed material was favorable and material |
| Allegation that State concealed/distorted Renard Price’s testimony (trial court relied on sealed grand jury review) | Defendants: trial court found State concealed/distorted Price’s role and testimony, depriving jury of impeachment/testimony | State: trial court sua sponte relied on grand jury materials and never gave State a chance to respond; Price’s substantive post‑conviction testimony did not exist at trial | Court: Vacated trial court’s Brady ruling to the extent it rested on alleged concealment/distortion of Price’s testimony and remanded so the State may brief and respond; trial court erred by granting relief on unpled grounds without giving State opportunity to respond |
| Ineffective assistance for failure to call Renard Price at trial | Defendants: Price would have testified (as he later did) that police fired first and defendants did not shoot, and counsel should have called him | State/Trial court: IAC claims previously adjudicated or procedurally barred | Court: Trial court erred dismissing this IAC claim as previously adjudicated; vacated that ruling and remanded for further proceedings on whether counsel were ineffective for failing to call Price |
| Validity of attempted‑manslaughter as responsive verdict | Marshall: attempted manslaughter is a logical impossibility (manslaughter lacks specific intent) | State: claim untimely and Louisiana precedent treats attempted manslaughter as a valid responsive verdict | Court: Denied Marshall’s claim — attempted manslaughter is a valid responsive verdict under Louisiana law; claim lacks merit |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (suppression of exculpatory or impeaching evidence violates due process)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (Brady materiality includes impeachment evidence)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (impeachment evidence about witnesses can require disclosure)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality standard: whether absence of evidence undermines confidence in the outcome)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (three‑part Brady/Strickler framework articulated for favorable, suppressed, material)
- State v. Cambrice, 202 So. 3d 482 (La. 2016) (adopting Strickler standard in Louisiana jurisprudence)
- State v. Harper, 17 So. 2d 260 (La. 1944) (Louisiana recognizes manslaughter variants and attempted manslaughter as a valid responsive verdict)
- State v. Qualls, 353 So. 2d 978 (La. 1977) (treatment of manslaughter and intent issues under Louisiana law)
- State v. Williams, 327 So. 2d 399 (La. 1976) (manslaughter/intent discussion supporting responsive‑verdict doctrine)
- State v. Marshall, 843 So. 2d 469 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2003) (direct appeal affirming convictions; background and procedural history)