STATE of Louisiana v. Gary LAYTON; State of Louisiana v. Gary Layton
168 So. 3d 358
La.2015Background
- Gary Layton is charged with forcible rape of a woman in 2013; he pleaded not guilty and the State filed a pretrial notice under La. Code Evid. art. 412.2 to admit prior "sexually assaultive behavior.”
- The State sought to admit two prior incidents: a 1977 aggravated rape (defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity) and a 1997 incident where Layton allegedly held a knife to a woman’s throat and fondled her breasts; the 1977 incident was deemed admissible by the trial court, the 1997 incident was excluded.
- The trial court excluded the 1997 incident reasoning it did not meet the statutory elements of sexual battery (which requires touching of genitals or anus); the Fourth Circuit denied writs and agreed.
- The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review to determine the meaning of the undefined statutory phrase "sexually assaultive behavior" in Art. 412.2 and whether the 1997 incident falls within it.
- The Court applied de novo review and examined legislative history, Article 412.2’s text and comments, and distinctions from Federal Rule of Evidence 413.
- The Court held Art. 412.2 uses a broad, non‑technical term; fondling of breasts at knifepoint qualifies as "sexually assaultive behavior" and thus the 1997 incident may be admissible subject to an Article 403 balancing test; the exclusion was reversed and the case remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Article 412.2 limits admissible prior acts to statutorily defined sexual offenses | State: Art. 412.2 permits evidence of other acts involving "sexually assaultive behavior," not limited to convictions | Layton: "Sexually assaultive behavior" should be read to mean only statutory sexual offenses (e.g., sexual battery) | Court: Article 412.2 is intentionally broad; not confined to technical statutory definitions |
| Whether the 1997 incident (knife + fondling breasts) qualifies as "sexually assaultive behavior" | State: Fondling breasts to arouse/gratify is sexually assaultive and falls within Art. 412.2 | Layton: Because sexual battery statute requires touching genitals/anus, fondling breasts is not a qualifying sexual offense | Court: Fondling breasts at knifepoint constitutes sexually assaultive behavior and may be admissible |
| Whether Federal Rule 413 limits the meaning of Art. 412.2 | State: Art. 412.2 was inspired by Fed. R. Evid. 413 but uses broader language | Layton: Because Rule 413 enumerates defined offenses, Art. 412.2 should be similarly limited | Court: Differences in wording show Legislature intended broader scope than Fed. R. Evid. 413 |
| Whether the 1997 allegation should nevertheless be excluded under Art. 403 balancing | State: If qualifying, the evidence still must pass an Article 403 probative vs. prejudicial balancing | Layton: 1997 incident is highly prejudicial and unproven, so should be excluded | Court: Trial court must perform the Article 403 balancing on remand (did not do so previously) |
Key Cases Cited
- Evans v. Lungrin, 708 So.2d 731 (La. 1998) (standard of review—de novo where trial court misinterprets law)
- Lasha v. Olin Corp., 625 So.2d 1002 (La. 1993) (de novo review principles)
- State v. McArthur, 719 So.2d 1037 (La. 1998) (prior decision rejecting a jurisprudential "lustful disposition" exception)
- State v. Kennedy, 803 So.2d 916 (La. 2001) (same as McArthur; important to legislative response)
- State v. Wright, 79 So.3d 309 (La. 2011) (discussing origins and purpose of Art. 412.2)