State of Louisiana v. Channing R. Gray
218 So. 3d 40
| La. | 2017Background
- Victim Derroceus Abney was murdered in Feb. 2007; his body was concealed in an inoperable freezer and a bloody fingerprint was found on the freezer door.
- Defendant’s fingerprint was identified in a national database and he was arrested in June 2013; grand jury indicted him for first‑degree murder (later amended to second‑degree).
- Before trial, crucial evidence/witnesses (including the freezer) became unavailable; on June 2, 2015 the State dismissed the murder prosecution and simultaneously filed a bill of information charging obstruction of justice (La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)).
- Defendant moved to quash the obstruction charge as prescribed under La. C.Cr.P. art. 572 (six‑year limitation); the State argued timeliness under La. C.Cr.P. art. 576 (new prosecution within six months of dismissal if based on the same facts).
- Trial court denied the motion to quash; the court of appeal granted it, holding obstruction was not "based on the same facts" as the murder charge and was time‑barred.
- Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari, held the obstruction prosecution was "based on the same facts" as the dismissed murder prosecution and reinstated the trial court’s denial of the motion to quash.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a subsequent obstruction prosecution is timely under La. C.Cr.P. art. 576 after dismissal of a murder indictment | Art. 576 permits instituting the obstruction charge within six months of dismissal because it is based on the same facts as the prosecuted murder | The obstruction charge was prescribed because the six‑year limit ran and the obstruction prosecution was not timely filed under art. 572 | Held: Article 576 applies; obstruction prosecution timely because it is based on the same facts as the dismissed murder prosecution |
| Meaning of "based on the same facts" in art. 576 | The phrase should be interpreted broadly; a second charge need only be based on some of the facts of the first charge | The phrase requires more than overlap; subsequent charge must not depend on additional facts occurring after completion of the first crime | Held: "Same facts" is broad — second charge may be based on some (not all) facts of the first; obstruction arose from the same factual nucleus (murder, concealment, bloody fingerprint) |
| Effect of timing when lesser‑offense prescription ran before indictment for the greater offense was filed | Art. 576 interrupts prescription so long as the first prosecution was "timely instituted" for a greater offense not subject to prescription | Prescription for the lesser offense having already run before indictment of the greater offense prevents art. 576 relief | Held: The codal scheme allows art. 576 to operate where the first prosecution (murder) was timely instituted (no statute of limitations for death/life offenses), so art. 576 can preserve the lesser charge within six months of dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Murray, 64 So.2d 230 (La. 1953) (held second information was based on same facts where later charge omitted one item of original theft)
- State v. Powers, 344 So.2d 1049 (La. 1977) (interpreted "based on the same facts" narrowly in distinguishing burglary and robbery where distinct factual elements were required)
- State v. Love, 847 So.2d 1198 (La. 2003) (appellate reversal of trial court’s discretionary factual rulings on motion to quash is limited to abuse of discretion)
- State v. Stetson, 317 So.2d 172 (La. 1975) (discussed policy justifications for statutory time limitations — repose and evidence preservation)
- State v. Hamdan, 112 So.3d 812 (La. 2013) (legal findings on pretrial motions reviewed de novo)