State of Louisiana in the Interest of A.C.
2017 WL 2869715
La.2017Background
- State filed delinquency petition (Mar 7, 2016) alleging 14-year-old A.C. committed aggravated rape of a child and indecent behavior; A.C. denied the allegations.
- Under La. Ch. Code art. 877(B), the adjudication hearing had to commence within 90 days (deadline June 6, 2016); juvenile court set the hearing for June 3, 2016.
- On June 3 the State moved to continue due to unavailable witnesses; defense objected and juvenile court dismissed the petition as untimely under the 90-day rule.
- The State sought supervisory review; the court of appeal initially reversed the dismissal (Oct. 7, 2016). A.C. did not seek rehearing in that writ; later (Oct. 13, 2016) A.C. moved to dismiss again.
- The court of appeal then granted A.C.’s writ and dismissed the petition for failure to timely commence the hearing (Dec. 28, 2016); one judge dissented, arguing the motion to dismiss filed Oct. 13 was premature because the earlier appellate ruling did not become final until Oct. 21, 2016.
- The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the court of appeal, holding the 90-day period was suspended while the State pursued supervisory review and that the State still had a short window to commence adjudication once the Supreme Court’s decision became final.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (A.C.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 90‑day adjudication period in La. Ch. Code art. 877(B) was suspended while the State sought supervisory review after the juvenile court dismissed the petition | Suspension is appropriate because the State needed appellate review to reinstate the petition and without suspension appellate review would be futile | The 90‑day clock continued running despite appellate review; the State’s delay forfeited the right to adjudicate | The Court held the 90‑day period was suspended during supervisory review; the State retained a short window to commence the adjudication once appellate rulings became final |
| Whether the juvenile court’s immediate dismissal on day 88 (after State’s June 3 motion to continue) was premature | The State argued good cause existed for a continuance and it sought review when the juvenile court denied relief | A.C. argued dismissal was proper because the State failed to obtain a timely extension before the 90‑day period expired | The Court did not decide the merits of good cause but found the dismissal was premature because the appellate process suspended the deadline |
| Effect of appellate finality on timing (applicability of La. C.Cr.P. art. 922(B) finality rule to Children’s Code review) | The State relied on appellate finality rules to show the period was tolled until appellate decision became final | A.C. argued the 90‑day limit had expired and his later dismissal motion was timely | The Court adopted La. C.Cr.P. art. 922(B) finality principles for Children’s Code supervisory review, concluding the court of appeal’s Oct. 7 ruling became final Oct. 21, 2016, so A.C.’s Oct. 13 motion was premature |
| Whether the State’s failure to obtain a stay before appellate review is fatal to tolling the 90‑day period | State conceded better practice would be to request a stay but argued lack of stay should not defeat tolling under these facts | A.C. argued waiting on appellate review was a delay beyond the State’s control that should not toll the clock | The Court held failure to obtain a stay was not fatal under the circumstances and tolling applied while review was pending |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Roberson, 179 So.3d 573 (La. 2015) (discusses purpose and mandatory nature of Article 877 time limits)
- State in the Interest of J.M., 156 So.3d 1161 (La. 2014) (explains Article 877’s mandatory deadlines and procedure for seeking review/stay)
- State in the Interest of R.D.C., Jr., 632 So.2d 745 (La. 1994) (recognizes judge should permit expedited appellate review of good‑cause rulings)
- State of Louisiana in the Interest of A.D., 98 So.3d 950 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2012) (observes waiting on appellate review delays the State’s ability to commence adjudication)