State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Deshawn Jackson, Appellant
52 Kan. App. 2d 125
Kan. Ct. App.2015Background
- Jackson was charged in 11CR411 with attempted first-degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and aggravated battery; his probation in an earlier case (10CR545) was revoked. He pled no contest to amended count of attempted second-degree murder and received 71 months, consecutive to a 16-month sentence in 10CR545.
- Attorney Aaron Gipson previously represented and was later reappointed to represent codefendant/witness Francisco Beltran (10CR546) while Gipson concurrently represented Jackson in 11CR411 and the probation-revocation matter.
- Jackson moved post‑sentence to withdraw his plea alleging (1) coercion — Gipson threatened he would receive maximum sentences if he went to trial — and (2) ineffective assistance due to Gipson’s conflict of interest from representing both Jackson and Beltran.
- At the withdrawal hearing, Gipson denied coercion, testified he informed Jackson he also represented Beltran, and said Jackson orally waived any conflict (no written waiver). The trial court credited Gipson, denied the motion, and found no manifest injustice.
- On appeal the majority held coercion claim failed (trial court credibility finding upheld) but found an actual conflict of interest existed, Jackson did not make a valid informed/written waiver, and the conflict adversely affected Gipson’s representation during plea negotiations; court reversed and remanded to grant withdrawal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Jackson) | Defendant's Argument (State/Gipson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plea was coercively induced | Gipson threatened Jackson with maximum exposure if he rejected plea | Gipson merely told Jackson prosecutor would seek maximum; no coercion | Coercion claim rejected — trial court credibility finding upheld |
| Whether Gipson’s concurrent representation created an actual conflict | Concurrent representation of Beltran (State witness) created an actual conflict | Gipson disclosed the dual representation to Jackson and Jackson accepted it; any conflict was theoretical or waived | Actual conflict existed — court finds conflict like Jenkins and Mickens situations |
| Whether Jackson validly waived the conflict | Any alleged oral waiver was not informed, not written, and insufficient under KRPC/Boldridge | Jackson knew and acquiesced to dual representation, so no manifest injustice | No valid waiver — oral waiver insufficient; written informed consent required; waiver inadequate here |
| Whether conflict adversely affected adequacy of counsel | Conflict compromised Gipson’s mindset in plea negotiations and incentivized urging a plea to avoid exposing the conflict at trial | No specific proof of adverse effect; Jackson failed to show an actual, not theoretical, impairment | Conflict did adversely affect adequacy at plea stage (majority); reversal ordered; dissent would require stronger, specific proof |
Key Cases Cited
- Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (conflict-of-interest claim requires proof the conflict actually adversely affected counsel when no timely objection)
- Galaviz v. State, 296 Kan. 168 (application of Mickens in Kansas; duty of loyalty and conflict analysis)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (benchmark for ineffective-assistance claims; duty of effective counsel)
- Boldridge v. State, 289 Kan. 618 (written informed waiver required for conflicts under KRPC; oral acquiescence insufficient)
- Jenkins v. State, 257 Kan. 1074 (attorney’s prior representation of key witness created conflict warranting relief)
- Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (attorney must notify court of conflicts; court must inquire)
- Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (Sixth Amendment protection extends to plea-bargain process)
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (plea negotiation is critical phase for effective assistance)