State of Iowa v. Vernon Lee Huser, 2017 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 47

Background

Vernon Huser was convicted (twice) of first-degree murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory for the death of Lance Morningstar; Louis Woolheater was separately convicted of the killing.
Huser and Morningstar had a personal history: Morningstar had an affair with Huser’s then-wife Deb; Huser made repeated threats and comments that Morningstar should be killed.
At the first trial, the court admitted hearsay statements by Woolheater (through third‑party witnesses Webb, Mitrisin, Connett) linking Huser to motive and Woolheater’s conduct; the court of appeals reversed that conviction for prejudicial hearsay.
At retrial the State largely avoided re‑offering those statements but elicited limited testimony from Patti Mitrisin that, through “without telling me what he said” questions, suggested Woolheater had talked about Morningstar, Deb, and Huser (a “backdoor” hearsay tactic). Huser moved for mistrial/striking/curative instructions.
The district court denied mistrial and refusal to strike Mitrisin’s whole testimony; it also excluded defense proffered Woolheater statements to Michelle Zwank on the ground admission would “open the door” to the State’s prior‑trial hearsay. Jury convicted; Huser appealed. The Iowa Supreme Court reverses and remands for new trial.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Huser)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Sufficiency of evidence to support aiding & abetting conviction	Evidence was circumstantial and lacked any direct proof Woolheater knew of Huser’s animus or was hired by Huser; no money trail or explicit agreement.	Evidence of motive (Huser’s threats), companionship/contacts with Woolheater, phone records, notes linking Huser to Woolheater’s files, and Woolheater’s statements to others sufficed.	The Court: evidence—viewed cumulatively—was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of aiding & abetting.
Mitrisin "backdoor" hearsay: timeliness, admissibility, and remedy (mistrial/strike/curative instruction)	District court had precluded such hearsay; Mitrisin’s answered questions (asked in a ‘don’t tell me what he said’ form) violated that ruling and prejudiced the jury—mistrial or striking testimony required.	Defense failed to contemporaneously object; the testimony was brief and vague; other admissible evidence showed the same connections; curative measures sufficed.	The Court: objection was timely; the questions were improper backdoor hearsay; but district court did not abuse discretion in denying mistrial or striking all testimony and in refusing extreme curative instructions given limited scope, other evidence, and compliance by the State not to mention it in closings.
Admission of Woolheater statements to Zwank (defense proffer) and "open the door" doctrine	Zwank’s post‑crime statements that Morningstar had something that could send Woolheater to jail were admissible as statements against interest and would show Woolheater’s independent motive; exclusion prejudiced Huser.	If Zwank’s statements admitted, the State argued it should be permitted to introduce the other Woolheater hearsay (Mitrisin/Webb/Connett); the district court warned admission would “open the door.”	The Court: Zwank’s post‑crime statement that Morningstar had something that could send Woolheater to jail was admissible as a statement against interest and should have been admitted; the district court’s “all or nothing” approach was incorrect; exclusion of Zwank’s testimony was not harmless—remand for new trial.
Prosecutorial misconduct / cumulative error (discovery, references to prior trial, conduct)	The State intentionally elicited backdoor hearsay, failed in discovery, and repeatedly referenced the prior trial; overall misconduct warrants mistrial.	References were inadvertent or trivial; the Mitrisin lapse was not pervasive; other evidence controlled.	The Court declined to resolve the broader prosecutorial‑misconduct claims because the case was resolved on other grounds (error in excluding Zwank and the backdoor hearsay finding was dispositive).

Key Cases Cited

State v. Ramirez, 616 N.W.2d 587 (Iowa 2000) (elements and proof required for aiding and abetting)
State v. Neiderbach, 837 N.W.2d 180 (Iowa 2013) (aiding and abetting requires assent, encouragement, or active participation; knowledge essential)
State v. McGuire, 572 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa 1997) (direct and circumstantial evidence equally probative)
State v. Paredes, 775 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa 2009) (multifactor test for corroboration of statement against interest)
United States v. Reyes, 18 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1994) (criticism of “without telling me what he said” questions that convey substance of inadmissible out‑of‑court statements)
United States v. Check, 582 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1978) (artful questioning cannot be used to introduce prejudicial hearsay through a witness’s limiting testimony)
State v. Veatch, 223 Or. App. 444, 196 P.3d 45 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (admission of testimony creating adverse inference may be incurable and require mistrial)
Jones v. United States, 625 A.2d 281 (D.C. 1993) (illustrates limits of inferring encouragement from mere presence or post‑offense conduct)