State of Iowa v. Valentin Velez, 2013 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 36

Velez pled guilty to two counts of willful injury causing serious injury after a plea agreement; one incident involved Kennedy and an accomplice during a home invasion.
Kennedy sustained multiple serious injuries (arm fractures, possible leg injury) from the attack; Kennedy’s injuries meet the statutory definition of serious injury.
Court of Appeals vacated one willful injury conviction due to lack of a sufficient factual basis for two distinct acts; case remanded to supplement the record.
District court accepted pleas and sentenced Velez; Velez challenged the sufficiency of the factual basis on direct appeal.
Welsh’s testimony and limited witness accounts form the primary factual basis for whether there were two discrete willful-injury acts.
This Iowa Supreme Court de novo review addresses whether the record supports two separate acts and whether double jeopardy or other doctrines apply.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether there was a proper factual basis for two separate acts of willful injury.	Velez; argues a single course of conduct precludes multiple offenses.	State; contends multiple discrete acts occurred based on Welsh’s testimony and Kennedy’s injuries.	Two separate acts established; factual basis exists.
Whether the two convictions violate Double Jeopardy because arising from a single incident.	Velez; contends the unit-of-prosecution should be a single act.	State; argues legislative intent supports multiple punishments for multiple acts.	No double jeopardy violation; legislative intent supports multiple acts.
Whether the rule of lenity applies to resolve ambiguity in unit of prosecution.	Velez; claims ambiguity requires lenity to limit charges.	State; asserts no ambiguity after legislative analysis and tests.	Rule of lenity does not apply; legislative intent resolves the issue.
Whether the one-homicide rule applies to willful-injury convictions arising from one victim.	Velez; asks to extend one-homicide rule to nonhomicide offenses.	State; seeks no expansion of the rule beyond homicide cases.	One-homicide rule not extended to willful injury convictions.
Whether collateral estoppel applies given the two pleas in a single proceeding.	Velez; argues collateral estoppel should apply to prevent duplicative convictions.	State; argues no collateral estoppel because pleas occurred in same proceeding.	Collateral estoppel not applicable.

State v. Walker, 610 N.W.2d 524 (Iowa 2000) (two separate acts can provide separate bases for convictions)
State v. Schmitz, 610 N.W.2d 514 (Iowa 2000) (Blockburger-inspired inquiry into whether acts are continuing or separate)
State v. Muhlenbruch, 728 N.W.2d 212 (Iowa 2007) (determines unit of prosecution by statutory language)
State v. Kidd, 562 N.W.2d 764 (Iowa 1997) (defines article 'an' and unit-of-prosecution considerations)
State v. Keene, 630 N.W.2d 579 (Iowa 2001) (guilty-plea factual basis and use of plea minutes in review)
State v. Ortiz, 789 N.W.2d 761 (Iowa 2010) (de novo review of ineffective assistance claims)
State v. Amsden, 300 N.W.2d 882 (Iowa 1981) (joinder and multiple acts in theft context)
State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1995) (one-homicide rule context)
Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1958) (discusses the difficulty of legislative intent in multi-punishment cases)
State v. Schmitz, 610 N.W.2d 514 (Iowa 2000) (Blockburger-related analysis of unit of prosecution)