State of Iowa v. Taquala Monique Howse
875 N.W.2d 684
| Iowa | 2016Background
- On June 23, 2013, police arrested Taquala Howse for theft and found a small hand-held stun gun in her purse; she admitted possession and had no permit.
- Officers testified about differences between Tasers and stun guns, describing stun guns as "pain compliance" devices that can cause pain, lead to compliance, and potentially cause death in certain circumstances (e.g., drug use or heart conditions).
- One officer testified the stun gun found was inoperable (lights worked when plugged in but it did not function properly); officers did not test it in the field for safety reasons.
- The district court found the stun gun was a "dangerous weapon" under Iowa Code § 702.7 and convicted Howse for carrying a concealed dangerous weapon (Iowa Code § 724.4(1)).
- The court of appeals reversed, holding insufficient evidence showed the inoperable stun gun was a dangerous weapon; the State sought further review.
- The Iowa Supreme Court granted review and held that stun guns—even if inoperable—are per se "dangerous weapons" under the statutory list in § 702.7, vacating the court of appeals and affirming the district court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a stun gun (even if not shown operable) is a "dangerous weapon" under Iowa Code § 702.7 | Statute's per se list includes “any portable device ... directing an electric current ... designed to immobilize a person,” which generically covers stun guns; operability need not be proved | A stun gun is designed to cause pain, not immobilize; here the device was inoperable so it cannot be a dangerous weapon | Held: Stun guns fall within the statutory per se list; operability is not required—an inoperable stun gun is a dangerous weapon |
| Whether the sufficiency-of-evidence claim is preserved for appeal | State argued some legal challenges were not preserved, but sufficiency claims from a bench trial may be raised on appeal | Howse argued insufficiency because the device was inoperable and evidence did not prove it could inflict death or immobilize | Held: Court addressed the merits; preservation not a barrier to sufficiency review in a bench trial context |
| Proper statutory interpretation approach (which definitional "path" controls) | The 2008 amendment created a per se category in the statute’s final sentence; courts should apply that path to stun/Taser-like devices | Howse urged reliance on earlier case law (Geier) and contested whether first-sentence analysis (designed to inflict death/injury) was required | Held: The last-sentence per se definition controls for stun guns; the Court need not rely on Geier’s first-sentence analysis (though Geier remains valid) |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Geier, 484 N.W.2d 167 (Iowa 1992) (addressed whether an operable stun gun met the statute’s first-sentence dangerous-weapon definition)
- State v. Durham, 323 N.W.2d 243 (Iowa 1982) (items listed in the statute’s final sentence are dangerous per se)
- State v. Hemminger, 308 N.W.2d 17 (Iowa 1981) (operability need not be proved for listed per se dangerous weapons)
- State v. Nichols, 276 N.W.2d 416 (Iowa 1979) (same principle regarding per se listed items)
- State v. Ashland, 145 N.W.2d 910 (Iowa 1966) (unloaded or inoperable firearm still treated as a dangerous weapon for legal purposes)