State of Iowa v. Roger James Cheshire, 15-1763

Roger Cheshire was charged with sexual abuse (class B felony), assault with intent to commit sexual abuse (aggravated misdemeanor), and indecent contact with a child (aggravated misdemeanor) for acts occurring between Jan. 1, 2003 and Dec. 31, 2005.
He entered a negotiated guilty plea to two serious-misdemeanor counts: lascivious conduct with a minor (Iowa Code §709.14) and indecent exposure (§709.9).
The district court imposed one-year sentences on each count (to run consecutively), suspended and placed Cheshire on probation, and added a ten-year special sentence of supervised custody under Iowa Code §903B.2 to begin after completion of the underlying sentence.
Cheshire argued the §903B.2 special sentence was an illegal ex post facto application because some conduct predated the statute’s effective date (July 1, 2005).
Cheshire also argued his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move in arrest of judgment because his guilty plea to lascivious conduct lacked a factual basis (specifically: coercion to disrobe and position of authority).
The court reviewed whether the plea and record supplied a factual basis and whether the special sentence violated ex post facto principles.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Legality of §903B.2 special sentence (ex post facto)	State: statute applies because defendant’s plea and admissions establish offense occurred after statute effective date	Cheshire: statute applied to conduct before July 1, 2005, so special sentence is ex post facto and illegal	Affirmed: special sentence not illegal; plea admissions establish offense occurred after effective date (Cowles governs)
Factual basis for lascivious-conduct plea	State: minutes and written plea admissions supply factual basis (coercion, authority, touching genital area)	Cheshire: record lacks evidence he forced/persuaded disrobing or was in position of authority	Affirmed: written plea expressly admitted authority, persuasion to move clothes, and sexual purpose; sufficient factual basis
Ineffective assistance for not moving in arrest of judgment	State: counsel was not ineffective because factual basis existed	Cheshire: counsel had duty to move because plea lacked factual basis, prejudice presumed	Affirmed: no deficient performance because factual basis present; no prejudice
Applicability of jury-verdict uncertainty precedent	State: guilty plea context allows implicit temporal admission	Cheshire: relies on Lathrop to argue temporal uncertainty defeats statute application	Held: Lathrop differs (uncertain jury verdict); Cowles controls—plea admissions can implicitly admit post-effective-date conduct

State v. Pickens, 558 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1997) (ex post facto doctrine forbids retroactive increase in punishment)
State v. Cowles, 757 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 2008) (guilty plea context can supply implicit admission that offense occurred after statute effective date, defeating ex post facto claim)
State v. Lathrop, 781 N.W.2d 288 (Iowa 2010) (where jury verdict lacks temporal specificity, defendant gets benefit of doubt for pre-effective-date conduct; ex post facto application invalid)
State v. Philo, 697 N.W.2d 481 (Iowa 2005) (defendant's on-record admission can provide factual basis for an element of the offense)