State of Iowa v. Randy Mitchell Copenhaver
2014 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 30
| Iowa | 2014Background
- On Feb. 11, 2010, defendant (masked) entered a bank, passed a note and verbally demanded money from teller Jamie Kasmiskie, then moved to teller Sandra Ries and demanded money there as well; total loss $6,852.
- Kasmiskie gave bait money after being told not to hit buttons; she felt fear and physical symptoms but no explicit weapon was shown. Ries reported a demanding tone, a gesture suggesting a weapon, and the defendant’s gloved hand touched her nose.
- Defendant was charged with two counts of second-degree robbery and one count of second-degree theft; jury convicted on all counts; trial court sentenced to consecutive terms for the two robberies.
- Defendant appealed arguing the two robberies should be merged into one (double jeopardy/illegal sentence) and that evidence was insufficient to support assaults on each teller; court of appeals affirmed and Iowa Supreme Court granted further review.
- The Supreme Court (majority) affirmed: it held the unit of prosecution for robbery is an intended theft coupled with at least one of the listed acts (assault/threat), and the evidence supported two intended thefts and two assaults; pro se issues were left to the court of appeals’ disposition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether two robbery convictions must be combined (unit of prosecution / double jeopardy) | State: unit of prosecution can support multiple robberies when separate intended thefts occur | Copenhaver: statute’s use of “any” means one intended theft + multiple assaults = one robbery; merger required | Unit of prosecution is an intended theft coupled with any listed act; multiple convictions proper only if there were multiple intended thefts; here evidence supported two intended thefts, so no illegal sentence |
| Sufficiency of evidence that defendant intended two separate thefts | State: separate approaches to two tellers, time interval, different windows, intervening act (Ries coming to window) support two intended thefts | Copenhaver: bank is single victim; single intended theft—single robbery | Court applied Ross factors (time interval, place, victims, intervening act, similarity, intent) and found substantial evidence of two distinct intended thefts |
| Sufficiency of evidence of assaults on each teller | State: mask, rapid approach, demanding words, gestures, touching (Ries) constitute overt acts and support specific intent to place each teller in fear | Copenhaver: no overt act and no specific intent to assault either teller | Court found overt acts (note, demands, gestures, glove contact) and inferred specific intent from circumstances; substantial evidence supported assaults on both tellers |
| Applicability of single-larceny rule (raised in concurrence) | State (implicit): statute and §714.3 allow prosecution of multiple thefts; single-larceny rule inapplicable | Concurrence: historical single-larceny rule and rule of lenity favor treating the takings as one theft (one robbery) | Majority: single-larceny rule does not bar multiple robbery convictions here; concurrence would have reversed second robbery but was in minority |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Ross, 845 N.W.2d 692 (Iowa 2014) (sets factors for determining whether successive acts are separate or one continuous act)
- State v. Kidd, 562 N.W.2d 764 (Iowa 1997) (unit-of-prosecution analysis; singular/plural wording can limit separate offenses)
- State v. Constable, 505 N.W.2d 473 (Iowa 1993) (multiple physical acts can be separately prosecutable under a statute describing “any” qualifying act)
- State v. Chrisman, 514 N.W.2d 57 (Iowa 1994) (discusses single-larceny rule and the legislature’s power to allow aggregation under §714.3)
- State v. Heard, 636 N.W.2d 227 (Iowa 2001) (assault requires an overt act; contextual analysis of overt act in robbery/assault cases)