State of Iowa v. Peter Leroy Veal
930 N.W.2d 293
Iowa2019Background
- June 29, 2016: Evans robbed Fort Madison Bank and Trust, fled, and was fatally shot after a police chase; Evans had a mask, handgun, and hand-held radio. Lilly (defendant) was Evans’s in‑law; Evans had been staying with Lilly and had access to Lilly’s Suburban.
- Eyewitness and surveillance evidence tied a Suburban (with a black fan on the mirror) and a white‑shirted passenger to the scene; Lilly’s Suburban contained a matching fan and a CB radio compatible with Evans’s radio; video placed Lilly near the bank around the time of the robbery.
- Lilly was charged with aiding and abetting first‑degree robbery, tried, convicted, and sentenced to 25 years (70% mandatory minimum).
- Pretrial Lilly (African‑American) challenged the jury pool as not a fair cross‑section: returned questionnaires showed essentially no self‑identified African‑Americans despite census data showing ~3% African‑American in Lee County. The district court denied the challenge.
- On appeal Lilly raised (1) Sixth Amendment / Iowa Const. art. I, §10 fair‑cross‑section claim, (2) insufficiency of evidence for aiding/abetting and knowledge of weapon, and (3) ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to move for acquittal on the weapon element. The Iowa Supreme Court conditionally affirmed the conviction but remanded for further development of the jury‑pool fair‑cross‑section record.
Issues
| Issue | Lilly's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fair‑cross‑section of jury pool (Duren prongs) | North Lee County pool systematically underrepresented African‑Americans (near zero respondents vs ~3% population); district court should find a violation | Pool composition reflected available lists (voter + DMV); underrepresentation not shown to be due to systematic exclusion; statistical thresholds should be higher or use simple screens | Remanded: court adopted a flexible statistical approach favoring standard‑deviation analysis and set a one‑standard‑deviation threshold for prong two; remand to develop record on causation (prong three) under Duren/Plain framework |
| Sufficiency of evidence that Lilly aided/abetted robbery (drove Evans; knew plan) | Evidence insufficient to prove Lilly drove Evans or had knowledge of robbery | Circumstantial evidence (Lilly’s Suburban features, CB radio, surveillance placing Lilly and passenger near bank, false statements) supports inference Lilly drove and knew intent | Affirmed: substantial circumstantial evidence supports that Lilly drove Evans and knew of the robbery; conviction stands unless jury‑pool violation is later found |
| Knowledge of weapon (element for first‑degree robbery dangerous‑weapon alternative) | Little evidence Lilly knew a firearm would be used; counsel should have moved for acquittal on that basis | If Lilly drove/was present, jury could infer knowledge of gun from its presence and other attire (mask, gloves, tape) | Affirmed: evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer Lilly knew a dangerous weapon would be used; counsel’s failure to move for acquittal on that ground not ineffective because the motion would have been meritless |
| Remedy / Burden on remand (scope of relief) | Seek reversal/new trial based on fair‑cross‑section violation | Opposes automatic relief; says systemic flaws are statewide and no remedy limited to this panel would help | Conditional affirmance of conviction; remand to allow Lilly to develop the record on statistical disparity and causation; if court finds a violation, grant new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801 (Iowa 2017) (adopted flexible approach to measuring underrepresentation and emphasized need for record development)
- Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (U.S. 1979) (three‑part fair‑cross‑section test)
- Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314 (U.S. 2010) (discussed statistical tests and imperfections; caution about methods)
- Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (U.S. 1977) (used binomial/standard‑deviation analysis to show significant underrepresentation)
- United States v. Hernandez‑Estrada, 749 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (criticized simple percentage comparisons; urged standard methods)
- State v. Jones, 490 N.W.2d 787 (Iowa 1992) (previously endorsed absolute‑disparity test; later overruled in part)
- State v. Henderson, 908 N.W.2d 868 (Iowa 2018) (discussed knowledge‑of‑weapon element and sufficiency standards)