State of Iowa v. Paul Anthony Spurgin
16-0478
Iowa Ct. App.Nov 23, 2016Background
- Monroe County Attorney moved to disqualify himself from prosecuting Paul Spurgin due to prior representation of Spurgin and family; the court granted the motion and appointed another county attorney to prosecute.
- Before appointment of a replacement was finalized, the disqualified Monroe County Attorney filed a five-count trial information charging Spurgin.
- Spurgin moved to dismiss the trial information "with prejudice," citing the county attorney's disqualification and Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.11(6)(c)(2); he also invoked the 45-day speedy-indictment rule in argument.
- The district court dismissed all five counts with prejudice, citing Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.33(1) for the misdemeanor counts and rule 2.33(2)(a) (the 45-day speedy-indictment provision) for the felony counts.
- The State appealed, conceding the county attorney lacked authority but arguing dismissal with prejudice was unauthorized under the rule actually invoked by Spurgin (rule 2.11) and, alternatively, that the State lacked notice the court would rely on rule 2.33.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the district court acted under rule 2.33, the State had notice that dismissal with prejudice was sought, and dismissal with prejudice was authorized as to misdemeanors under 2.33(1) and as to felonies under 2.33(2)(a).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether dismissal with prejudice was authorized where disqualified county attorney filed information | Dismissal should be under rule 2.11, which requires dismissal without prejudice (allowing refiling) | Dismissal with prejudice was proper because rule 2.33 authorized dismissal where prosecutor lacked authority | Held: Court dismissed under rule 2.33; dismissal with prejudice was authorized and affirmed |
| Whether State had adequate notice the court would rely on rule 2.33 and impose prejudice | State: lacked notice that court would invoke 2.33 sua sponte, so dismissal with prejudice was improper | Spurgin: motion and hearing put State on notice he sought dismissal with prejudice and cited speedy-indictment rule 2.33(2)(a) | Held: State had notice (motion requested dismissal with prejudice and counsel argued for prejudice); reliance on 2.33 was permissible |
| Applicability of speedy-indictment rule (2.33(2)(a)) to felony counts filed by disqualified prosecutor | State: speedy-rule dismissal should be under 2.11 and without prejudice | Spurgin: information was void because filed by disqualified prosecutor, so 45-day rule mandated dismissal with prejudice for felonies | Held: 2.33(2)(a) applies; felony counts dismissed with prejudice for violation of speedy-indictment rule |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Brumage, 435 N.W.2d 337 (Iowa 1989) (standard of review and factors for dismissal under rule 2.33(1))
- Ennenga v. State, 812 N.W.2d 696 (Iowa 2012) (rule 2.33(2)(a) speedy-indictment dismissal is with prejudice for felonies)
- State v. Tarbox, 739 N.W.2d 850 (Iowa 2007) (standard of review for speedy-trial/indictment issues)
- State v. Hoegh, 632 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 2001) (information filed by unauthorized person is subject to dismissal but refiling permissible)
- State v. Fisher, 351 N.W.2d 798 (Iowa 1984) (rule 2.33(1) may be invoked only by court sua sponte or prosecutor; "furtherance of justice" scope)
- State v. Lundeen, 297 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa Ct. App. 1980) (procedural protections and notice when court contemplates dismissal under rule 2.33(1))
