State of Iowa v. Mercedes JoJean Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98

Background:

Defendant Mercedes Damme was charged with two counts of third-degree theft after related home thefts; police recovered stolen items and methamphetamine during a warrant search.
Damme pleaded guilty in March 2019 under plea agreements in which the State agreed to seek no more than a two-year sentence and to recommend suspension if she entered a treatment program; plea forms included waivers concerning motions in arrest of judgment.
On July 1, 2019 (the effective date of 2019 amendments to Iowa Code ch. 814), the district court rejected the parties’ recommended/suspended sentence and imposed concurrent indeterminate two-year terms plus fines and fees.
Damme appealed the sentence on July 8, 2019; the State moved to dismiss under amended Iowa Code § 814.6, arguing that guilty-plea defendants must show "good cause" to appeal.
The Iowa Supreme Court retained the case to interpret the statutory "good cause" requirement and to resolve Damme’s sentencing, Rule 2.24/2.8 advisement, and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel issues.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Damme)	Held
1) Does Damme show "good cause" under Iowa Code § 814.6 to appeal a sentence after a guilty plea?	"Good cause" should be narrowly construed to limit appeals from guilty pleas; dismissal required absent good cause.	A sentencing challenge to a nonmandatory, non-plea-agreed sentence is a legally sufficient reason to appeal.	Court: "Good cause" means a "legally sufficient reason." It exists where defendant appeals a discretionary sentence that was neither mandatory nor agreed to in the plea. Appeal allowed.
2) Did the sentencing court improperly rely on Damme's family criminal history ("family stock") such that resentencing is required?	The court properly considered family circumstances in mitigation and other PSI factors; no abuse of discretion.	The court improperly punished Damme for family members' crimes; "family stock" language suggests impermissible hereditary reasoning.	Court: Although the phrase was ill-chosen, the record shows the court considered family circumstances as mitigation (lack of role models), not genetic predisposition. No abuse of discretion; sentence affirmed.
3) Was Damme inadequately advised of the right to file a motion in arrest of judgment under Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a) and 2.8(2)(d)?	N/A (State relied on written plea forms and compliance).	She contends she was not properly advised of the motion and deadlines.	Court: Written plea forms substantially complied with rules and informed Damme of the motion and deadlines; she waived the right. No relief.
4) May the court address ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal after the 2019 amendment to Iowa Code § 814.7?	§ 814.7 precludes deciding ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal; such claims must proceed via postconviction relief.	Damme urged review of trial counsel’s failure to object and to move for reconsideration.	Court: § 814.7 applies to judgments entered July 1, 2019; the court lacks authority to decide ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal. Those claims must be raised in postconviction proceedings.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720 (Iowa 2002) (standard of review and factors for sentencing)
State v. Grandberry, 619 N.W.2d 399 (Iowa 2000) (any improper consideration in sentencing requires resentencing)
State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128 (Iowa 2006) (substantial compliance with plea advisement rules)
State v. Macke, 933 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 2019) (effective-date rule for 2019 amendments to ch. 814)
State v. Wickes, 910 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa 2018) (presumption in favor of sentencing decisions and burden to show reliance on improper evidence)
United States v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2011) (impermissibility of relying on unsupported genetic/hereditary reasoning in sentencing)