State of Iowa v. Matthew Earl Cox
16-0102
Iowa Ct. App.Sep 27, 2017Background
- In 2006 Cox was charged and in 2008 convicted by a jury of second-degree sexual abuse for conduct committed when he was 15; he was resentenced in 2009 to an indeterminate 25-year term with a 70% mandatory minimum and a lifetime sex-offender registration requirement under Iowa Code chapter 692A.
- In 2015 Cox moved to correct an illegal sentence, asking among other relief to be excused from lifetime sex-offender registration because the offense was juvenile-era conduct.
- The district court granted relief as to mandatory parole/minimums but denied relief from the lifetime registration requirement; Cox appealed that denial.
- Cox argued lifetime registration (1) is punitive and cruel-and-unusual when applied to juvenile conduct, (2) is an ex post facto application, and (3) violates due process because it lacks an individualized risk determination.
- The court below relied on recent Iowa Supreme Court precedent holding 692A nonpunitive and constitutional as applied to juveniles, and noted statutory § 692A.128 permits post-release applications to modify or lift registration requirements after a statutory waiting period.
- The appellate court affirmed: continued registration was not an illegal sentence because 692A is nonpunitive, not ex post facto, and provides adequate procedural safeguards (including § 692A.128) to satisfy due process.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether lifetime sex-offender registration for juvenile conduct is punitive/cruel and unusual | State: 692A is regulatory, not punitive | Cox: Lifetime registration for juvenile conduct is punitive and violates cruel-and-unusual protections | Denied — court follows Iowa Supreme Court precedent that 692A is nonpunitive and not cruel-and-unusual when applied to juveniles (Graham, Pickens, Seering) |
| Whether applying 692A to Cox is an ex post facto punishment | State: 692A is remedial/regulatory, not punitive, so no ex post facto problem | Cox: Imposing lifetime registration for conduct committed before the statute’s enactment is ex post facto punishment | Denied — statute held nonpunitive in Pickens and reaffirmed in Graham, so not an ex post facto punishment |
| Whether lifetime registration without an individualized risk finding violates due process | State: Conviction process and § 692A.128’s post-release modification process provide sufficient process | Cox: Due process requires individualized risk determination before imposing lifetime registration on a juvenile offender | Denied — court finds no liberty interest if statute is nonpunitive; even assuming one, procedural protections (conviction safeguards and § 692A.128) are adequate and practical timing for individualized assessment is post-release |
| Whether timing and mechanics of § 692A.128 render post-release review illusory (ripeness and veto by DOC) | State: § 692A.128 allows judicial modification after statutory waiting period; DOC cannot arbitrarily veto stipulation | Cox: Relief is premature while incarcerated; the statute’s requirement of DOC stipulation can block relief | Denied/not ripe — court finds claim premature now and that statutory review is real and reviewable; DOC cannot arbitrarily withhold stipulation without judicial oversight |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Graham, 897 N.W.2d 476 (Iowa 2017) (Iowa Supreme Court: lifetime parole and lifetime registration challenges as applied to juveniles addressed; registration held nonpunitive)
- State v. Pickens, 558 N.W.2d 398 (Iowa 1997) (Iowa Supreme Court: Iowa’s sex-offender registration statute is remedial, not punitive)
- State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa 2005) (Iowa Supreme Court: upheld constitutionality of registration regime against due process and Eighth Amendment challenges)
- Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2003) (U.S. Supreme Court: procedural due process challenge to sex-offender registry premised on conviction rejected)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2012) (U.S. Supreme Court: categorical limits on harsh mandatory juvenile sentences; cited for the proposition that some mandatory juvenile sentencing schemes require individualized consideration)
