State of Iowa v. Latrice L. Lacey, 968 N.W.2d 792

Background

On April 30, 2018 Latrice Lacey confronted Clyde Richardson outside his workplace, shoved and struck him, kneed or attempted to knee him, and struck him with a small sledgehammer; the incident was captured on surveillance video and witnessed by a coworker and a nearby resident.
Lacey was charged with three counts of domestic abuse assault and one count of first-degree harassment; after a first mistrial, a second jury convicted her of second-degree harassment and deadlocked on the assault counts.
The district court imposed a one-year sentence, suspended it, and placed Lacey on probation; Lacey appealed.
While the appeal was pending the remaining assault charges were retried and Lacey was acquitted, mooting but not preventing resolution of a jurisdictional question about appealability of a sentence on fewer-than-all counts.
The Supreme Court exercised the public-importance exception, held a sentence on a subset of counts in a multicount information is a final, appealable judgment, and addressed Lacey’s challenges to sufficiency of the evidence, evidentiary exclusions, and sentencing.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff (State) Argument	Defendant (Lacey) Argument	Held
Appealability/finality: Is entry of judgment of sentence on one count in a multicount information a final appealable judgment?	A sentence terminates litigation as to that count and is appealable as of right.	Not final while other counts remain pending; appeal should await resolution of all counts.	Judgment of sentence on separate counts is final and appealable; Iowa adopts majority rule.
Sufficiency of evidence for 2nd-degree harassment (Iowa Code §708.7)	Evidence (video, eyewitnesses, threat “I’m gonna beat you,” physical attack with hammer) supports personal contact, communicated threat, and specific intent to threaten/intimidate.	Attack was meant to stop harassment; lacked intent to threaten; insufficient evidence.	Conviction sustained — substantial evidence supports all three elements.
Evidence exclusions: (a) testimony about domestic-abuse cycle; (b) many of Richardson’s text messages	(a) Testimony was speculative and proponent failed to make an offer of proof; (b) Many texts were cumulative, minimally probative, and unfairly prejudicial under Iowa R. Evid. 5.403.	(a) Domestic-abuse-cycle testimony explained motive and context; (b) Excluded texts were critical proof of harassment and Lacey’s defensive intent.	(a) Error not preserved — no offer of proof. (b) Exclusion affirmed — probative value low/cumulative and prejudicial, so not an abuse of discretion.
Sentencing: Should sentencing have been stayed pending retrial, and was the sentence abusive?	Court properly exercised discretion to proceed; sentencing court could consider hammer display and other factors; sentence within statutory range.	Court should have stayed sentencing; use of hammer evidence improper given hung assault counts; sentence excessive and relied on single factor.	No abuse of discretion: no improper consideration of acquitted/hung counts; sentence (suspended one-year) upheld.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Propps, 897 N.W.2d 91 (Iowa 2017) (defining final judgment in criminal cases as sentence)
State v. Lekin, 271 N.W.2d 697 (Iowa 1978) (dismissal of some counts in a multicount information can be final)
United States v. King, 257 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2001) (sentence on subset of counts is severable and immediately appealable)
United States v. Abrams, 137 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 1998) (sentencing on resolved counts is final despite unresolved counts)
State v. Button, 622 N.W.2d 480 (Iowa 2001) (threats evaluated in light of context; true threats not legitimate purpose)
State v. Milner, 571 N.W.2d 7 (Iowa 1997) (ordinary meaning and contextual analysis of threats)
State v. Evans, 672 N.W.2d 328 (Iowa 2003) (specific intent for harassment may be inferred from conduct)
State v. Einfeldt, 914 N.W.2d 773 (Iowa 2018) (applying Rule 5.403 balancing standard)
State v. Shearon, 449 N.W.2d 86 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (minimally relevant inflammatory evidence may be excluded as unfairly prejudicial)