State of Iowa v. Kenneth L. Lilly, 930 N.W.2d 319

Background

On June 29, 2016 a masked Lafayette Evans robbed Fort Madison Bank; Evans was later killed by police; a handgun, mask, and handheld radio were found on him.
Kenneth Lilly (African‑American) was charged with aiding and abetting first‑degree robbery; evidence placed Evans in Lilly’s Suburban and showed Lilly’s Suburban contained a black fan and a CB radio compatible with Evans’s radio. Surveillance contradicted Lilly’s alibi.
Jury selection in North Lee County produced a venire and petit jury with no African‑American members; five years of county "race reports" showed 14 self‑reported African‑American responses out of ~2,789 questionnaires.
Lilly moved to dismiss the jury panel as not a fair cross‑section under the Sixth Amendment and Iowa Const. art. I, §10; the district court denied the motion; Lilly was convicted and sentenced to 25 years (70% mandatory minimum).
On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction as to sufficiency of evidence and ineffective assistance claims, but conditionally affirmed and remanded for further proceedings on the fair‑cross‑section claim under refined standards announced in State v. Plain.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Whether jury pool violated right to fair cross‑section (Sixth Amendment & Iowa Const.)	Lilly: North Lee venire had no African‑Americans; five‑year reports show underrepresentation due to system	State: Lists used (voter & DMV) are neutral; small minority population and age/eligibility differences explain results	Court: Remanded for further development under refined Duren/Plain framework; adopted one standard deviation as initial statistical threshold under Iowa Const.
2) Appropriate statistical test for prong two (fair & reasonable representation)	Lilly: Plain left unclear how to analyze small minority populations	State: Courts need practical screen; urged simple absolute disparity	Held: Court rejected absolute/comparative tests as controlling; directed use of accepted statistical methods (standard deviation) and set one standard deviation below expected as threshold for prima facie showing (with eligibility adjustments and possible aggregation over venires).
3) Whether underrepresentation must be tied to systematic exclusion and what practices qualify	Lilly: County practices (lists used, follow‑up, excuses) can cause systematic exclusion; NAACP urged burden shifting when disparity severe	State: Must prove causation; routine practices permissible; no burden shift	Held: Defendant must show causation linking disparity to jury‑management practices; but court recognized routine management practices (address lists, excuses, enforcement) can, if shown to cause disparity, constitute systematic exclusion under Iowa Const.; remand permitted to develop record.
4) Sufficiency of evidence for aiding/abetting first‑degree robbery and ineffective assistance claim	Lilly: No proof he drove Evans or knew a firearm would be used; counsel ineffective for not moving acquittal on dangerous‑weapon element	State: Circumstantial evidence (vehicle type, fan, CB radio, eyewitness, surveillance, mask/gloves, cinch bag) supports inference he drove and knew of weapon	Held: Evidence was substantial to support that Lilly drove Evans and knew of the weapon; counsel not ineffective on that basis.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801 (Iowa 2017) (refining Iowa fair‑cross‑section analysis)
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (establishing three‑part fair‑cross‑section prima facie test)
Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314 (2010) (discussing limits of statistical tests and causation in jury composition claims)
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (use of binomial/standard deviation analysis to show systematic exclusion)
State v. Jones, 490 N.W.2d 787 (Iowa 1992) (earlier Iowa precedent adopting absolute disparity test, later overruled in part)