State of Iowa v. Kelvin Plain Sr., 2017 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 80

Background

Defendant Kelvin Plain (Black) was tried in Black Hawk County for first-degree harassment (aggravated misdemeanor) after an altercation with neighbor Randy Gray (White) involving thrown bolt cutters and alleged threats; jury convicted.
Jury pool for that trial included 56 potential petit jurors but only one African‑American (1.8%) while county population was 8.9% African‑American; defendant objected to racial composition but did not present systematic-exclusion proof at trial.
During trial the court admitted an investigating officer’s testimony recounting what witnesses told him about the cause of a wall mark (later deemed hearsay), played a redacted 911 call that post‑trial review showed may have referenced defendant’s prior custody/GPS status (defense sought mistrial; court gave limiting instruction), and denied an implicit‑bias jury instruction requested by Plain.
Prosecutor repeatedly referred to the complaining witness as the “victim” during closing argument over defense objection; defense claimed this impaired the presumption of innocence.
On appeal the Iowa Supreme Court (majority) addressed: admissibility/prejudice of the hearsay, whether a mistrial was required for the 911 content, denial of implicit‑bias instruction, prosecutor’s use of “victim,” and whether the jury venire violated the Sixth Amendment fair‑cross‑section requirement; most errors found non‑prejudicial except instructional/legal‑test errors tied to jury representativeness.
The court overruled State v. Jones to abandon exclusive reliance on absolute‑disparity analysis for fair‑cross‑section claims and allowed use of absolute disparity, comparative disparity, and standard deviation analyses; remanded conditionally for development of the record on systematic underrepresentation (State must provide jury records).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admission of officer’s testimony recounting witnesses’ statements (hearsay)	Officer’s recounting was inadmissible hearsay used for truth of the matter (that bolt cutters caused the mark)	State said testimony explained officer’s subsequent actions (taking bolt cutters/custody)	Testimony was hearsay but cumulative of other admitted physical evidence and limiting instruction; no reversible prejudice (admission harmless)
Reference in 911 recording to prior custody/GPS — mistrial?	Plain argued references to prior convictions/probation were inadmissible and required mistrial	State claimed redaction and that references were inadvertent and brief; court offered limiting instruction	Evidence inadmissible under Rule 5.404(6) but references were brief/inadvertent; cautionary instruction promptly given and no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial
Denial of requested implicit‑bias jury instruction	Plain: instruction correctly stated law and would mitigate unfair racial bias; requested as cautionary instruction	State/court: no Iowa authority or model instruction requiring it; discretionary	Trial court erred by thinking it lacked authority (giving such cautionary instructions is permitted) but error was harmless given strong evidence; no reversal. Court encourages proactive addressing of implicit bias but does not mandate a single instruction
Prosecutor’s repeated use of term “victim” in closings	Plain: repeated use improperly conveyed prosecutor’s opinion that a crime occurred and prejudiced jury	State: use was a reasonable inference from the evidence; term used in many jurisdictions as shorthand	Persistent use was improper (error) but not intentional misconduct; given jury instruction that summations are not evidence and strong state case, error was not prejudicial — no reversal
Sixth Amendment fair‑cross‑section challenge to jury venire	Plain: panel underrepresented African‑Americans (1.8% vs 8.9%); lack of access to historical jury records prevented meeting Duren’s systematic‑exclusion prong	State: defendant failed to make prima facie case (no proof of systematic exclusion)	Court overrules Jones and rejects exclusive use of absolute disparity; permits multiple statistical analyses (absolute, comparative, standard deviation); remands for development of record on systematic underrepresentation and requires State to provide relevant jury selection records; conditional affirmance pending that inquiry

Key Cases Cited

Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (establishes three‑part fair‑cross‑section test for jury venires)
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (discusses use of statistical measures and standard deviation in jury selection analysis)
Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314 (2010) (permits consideration of multiple analytical models in fair‑cross‑section inquiries)
State v. Jones, 490 N.W.2d 787 (Iowa 1992) (Iowa precedent adopting exclusive absolute‑disparity approach; overruled here)
State v. Tompkins, 859 N.W.2d 631 (Iowa 2015) (explains limits of admitting out‑of‑court statements to law enforcement as non‑hearsay)
State v. Elliott, 806 N.W.2d 660 (Iowa 2011) (officer repetition of victim’s complaint likely viewed by jury as substantive evidence)
State v. McGuire, 572 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa 1997) (admission of cumulative evidence is less likely to be prejudicial)
State v. Hildreth, 582 N.W.2d 167 (Iowa 1998) (cumulative hearsay may be harmless)
United States v. Hernandez‑Estrada, 749 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2014) (discusses comparative disparity and permitting multiple analyses)
United States v. Rogers, 73 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 1996) (criticized exclusive reliance on absolute disparity)
State v. Chidester, 570 N.W.2d 78 (Iowa 1997) (de novo review of constitutional issues)
State v. Dudley, 856 N.W.2d 668 (Iowa 2014) (standard for reviewing evidentiary rulings and harmless‑error analysis)